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POLITICAL INSIDER TRADING
Michael R. Siebecker*
Should the same legal principles that prohibit insider trading require
corporations to disclose their political spending as well? The question
seems particularly important in light of the increasing dominance of
corporations in the political realm, the lack of transparency regarding
corporate political activity, and the inherently suspicious motives of
corporate executives who use corporate treasuries to advance their
personal political preferences. This Article examines how the fiduciary
principles of trust that underpin prohibitions on insider trading could
inform and enhance the content of the general fiduciary duties that
corporate officers and directors owe to their shareholders. Although
insider trading prohibitions rest on the statutory foundation of federal
securities law, the U.S. Supreme Court extrapolates the content of insider
trading doctrine from the overarching common law fiduciary duties that
govern the daily decisions of corporate managers. In the insider trading
context, however, the Supreme Court has articulated a special disclosure
obligation based on those fiduciary duties that is not currently recognized
in other areas of corporate law. In particular, the Supreme Court requires
that to avoid liability for illicit insider trading, a corporate insider who
possesses material nonpublic information must either disclose that
information to shareholders prior to trading or abstain from trading
altogether.
A fiduciary breach due to secret use of corporate assets for personal gain
marks the essential concern in both the insider trading realm and in the
context of corporate political spending. Therefore, adopting a similar
common law fiduciary rule that corporate managers must disclose the
amount and target of political expenditures or refrain from engaging in
political activity does not seem like much of an intellectual leap. Not only
would such a common law disclosure duty fit neatly within existing
corporate governance principles, but the compelled transparency would not
offend corporations’ First Amendment rights. In the end, prohibiting
political insider trading through a “disclose or abstain” rule for corporate
political spending would promote greater efficiency in the capital markets,
ensure corporate accountability and political legitimacy, and sustain the
growing market for corporate social responsibility.
* Professor of Law, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law. B.A., Yale; J.D., LL.M.,
Ph.D., Columbia. For helpful insights and suggestions, I express special thanks to Bernard
Chao, Kevin Lynch, Justin Pidot, and Tim Thein.
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INTRODUCTION
Should the same legal principles that prohibit insider trading require
corporations to disclose their political spending as well? The question
seems particularly important in light of the increasing dominance of
corporations in the political realm, the lack of transparency regarding
corporate political activity, and the inherently suspicious motives of
corporate executives who use corporate treasuries to advance their personal
political preferences.
This Article intends to examine how the fiduciary principles of trust that
underpin prohibitions on insider trading could inform and enhance the
content of the general fiduciary duties that corporate officers and directors
owe to their shareholders. Although insider trading prohibitions rest on the
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statutory foundation of federal securities law,1 the U.S. Supreme Court
extrapolates the content of insider trading doctrine from the overarching
common law fiduciary duties that govern the daily decisions of corporate
managers.2 In the insider trading context, however, the Supreme Court has
articulated a special disclosure obligation based on those fiduciary duties
that are not currently recognized in other areas of corporate law. In
particular, the Supreme Court requires that to avoid liability for illicit
insider trading, a corporate insider who possesses material nonpublic
information must either disclose that information to shareholders prior to
trading or abstain from trading altogether.3 That disclosure requirement
arises from the basic notion that corporate insiders cannot use company
assets (i.e., information) for personal gain at the expense of shareholders to
whom corporate insiders owe a duty of trust.4 Only through disclosure of
the material nonpublic information prior to trading with existing or
potential shareholders could corporate insiders ensure a level playing field
and avoid upending their fundamental fiduciary obligations.
With that in mind, might the same fiduciary-based disclosure duty
articulated in the context of insider trading be applied in the context of
corporate political spending? Answering that question depends on whether
trading based on material nonpublic information represents a sufficiently
similar breach of trust as failing to disclose corporate political spending.
Obviously, using the corporate treasury for political spending certainly does
not involve trading in company securities. But in light of the rather tenuous
connection between corporate profitability and political spending,5 using
corporate funds to affect elections raises the specter of corporate insiders
using company assets to advance their own personal interests, potentially to

1. See Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading
and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845, 854–56 (2013).
2. See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary
Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1317–22 (2009).
3. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 734–35 (2006).
4. The fiduciary relationship exists not just between the insider and existing
shareholders but to potential shareholders as well. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 227 n.8 (1980) (quoting Judge Learned Hand’s statement in Gratz v. Claughton, 187
F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951)); see also Nagy, supra note 2, at 1338 (“Chiarella maintained,
however, that it would be a ‘sorry distinction’ to recognize fiduciary duties between a
shareholder and an insider but not to recognize such duties in the very transaction where the
person became a shareholder. As Professor Victor Brudney observed, it is more than a little
ironic ‘that the Supreme Court, in its efforts to narrow the scope of the disclosure
requirements of Section 10(b), assumed, and in some sense may have furthered, broad local
fiduciary law disclosure obligations of management and controllers.’” (quoting Victor
Brudney, O’Hagan’s Problems, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 249, 255 n.15)).
5. See John C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After
Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657, 658 (2012); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy,
Safeguarding Markets from Pernicious Pay to Play: A Model Explaining Why the SEC
Regulates Money in Politics, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 361, 392–94 (2013); Alison Frankel,
Why Shield Corporations from Disclosing Political Spending?, REUTERS (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/12/16/why-shield-corporations-from-disclosingpolitical-spending/ [https://perma.cc/7R58-YM3C].
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the detriment of the corporation.6 Although corporate managers could
easily claim that political spending advances the interests of the company
rather than their own predilections, there is simply no way for shareholders
to assess the existence of a breach of trust without disclosure.7 As some of
the most important political decisions get made behind corporate
boardroom doors, ensuring that managers cannot co-opt corporate coffers
for illicit personal benefit seems of paramount importance.
To assess the feasibility and desirability of incorporating the disclosure
obligation from insider trading doctrine into the fiduciary duties governing
corporate political spending, Part I describes the hostile acquisition of
American politics by corporations. Part II explicates the doctrine and
fiduciary foundations that gave rise to an affirmative disclosure duty on the
part of corporate insiders interested in trading based on material nonpublic
information. Moving from the problem to a potential solution, Part III
discusses how a fiduciary-based disclosure obligation in the context of
political spending might prevent managers from using the corporate
treasury to promote their own personal interests at the expense of the
company. Part IV addresses any constitutional impediments to adopting a
common law disclosure rule for corporate political spending. Part V
explores a variety of potential advantages and drawbacks to extending
insider trading principles to corporate spending practices. Finally, this
Article concludes that extending a fiduciary-based disclosure obligation
from insider trading doctrine to the context of corporate political spending
would promote efficiency in the capital markets, ensure corporate
accountability and political legitimacy, and sustain the growing market for
corporate social responsibility.
I. THE POLITICAL CORPORATION
The practical impetus for considering a corporate political spending
disclosure rule based on insider trading principles stems from the
dominance of corporations in the political realm. The concentration of
political power in the hands of corporate boards makes the potential for
corruption through secret use of corporate assets of paramount concern.
Although concerted efforts on a variety of fronts have tried to stem the
opportunities for deceit, corporate managers remain largely free to use
corporate coffers to advance secret political agendas.
A. The Hostile Acquisition of American Politics
In the early part of the twentieth century, Adolph Berle and Gardiner
Means predicted in The Modern Corporation and Private Property that the
6. James Kwak, Citizens United v. FEC Turns 2—And It’s Still Wrong, ATLANTIC (Jan.
20, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/01/citizens-united-v-fec-turns2-and-its-still-wrong/251706/ (“[I]f corporations’ political spending were left up to
individuals, like executives or directors, those individuals could advance their personal
interests by directing money to their preferred political organizations.”) [https://perma.cc/
R2JQ-PCBM].
7. See Editorial, Keeping Shareholders in the Dark, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2013, at A32.
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corporation would evolve to surpass government as the most powerful
institution in society.8 Indeed, the political influence of corporations and
their control over important facets of our daily lives9 grew rapidly as
corporations amassed vast amounts of capital.10 The potential for political
control of our collective lives under an unaccountable cloak of anonymity
frames the problem of political insider trading.
1. Monopolizing the Market
With respect to the growing political influence of corporations, the
Supreme Court gave big business a new type of jurisprudential rocket fuel
with its decision in Citizens United v. FEC.11 In that landmark case, the
Court gave corporations essentially the same political speech rights as
human beings12 and held unconstitutional any limits on the amount of
independent political expenditures13 that corporations could make in an
election.14 In the immediate aftermath of Citizens United, many predicted
that corporate dominance of the political arena would infect irreparably
American democratic processes.15 At the time, President Barack Obama
warned that “a new stampede of special interest money in our politics”
8. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 357 (1932).
9. See Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20thCentury American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 179–80 (2005).
10. See Timothy K. Kuhner, The Separation of Business and State, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
2353, 2354–55, 2361–64 (2007); Arthur S. Miller, Corporations and Our Two Constitutions,
in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 241, 242 (Warren J. Samuels &
Arthur S. Miller eds., 1987) (stating that corporations’ “power and influence, both externally
in the national political order and internally in the so-called corporate community, make
them a true form of governance”).
11. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
12. Id. at 319.
13. According to the Federal Election Commission, “[A]n independent expenditure is an
expenditure for a communication which expressly advocates the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate and which is made independently from the candidate’s
campaign.” The FEC and the Federal Campaign Finance Law, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/
pages/brochures/fecfeca.shtml#Independent_Expenditures (last updated Feb. 2017) [https://
perma.cc/UJA2-RQ58].
14. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342–46.
15. See Gabrielle Levy, How Citizens United Has Changed Politics in 5 Years, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 21, 2015, 12:26 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2015/01/21/5-years-later-citizens-united-has-remade-us-politics (“In its Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission decision, the court opened the campaign spending
floodgates.”) [https://perma.cc/6NFD-TWSJ]; Christopher P. Skroupa, Investors Want
Disclosure of Corporate Political Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures, FORBES (Apr.
20, 2012, 1:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherskroupa/2012/04/20/investorswant-disclosure-of-corporate-political-contributions-and-lobbying-expenditures-2/print/
(quoting the ALF-CIO counsel, who said that “Citizens United opened the floodgates for the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ALEC and super-PACs that serve as a direct threat to
shareholder rights, economic growth and free enterprise”) [https://perma.cc/6SW9-XA33];
Kenneth P. Vogel, Court Decision Opens Floodgates for Corporate Cash, POLITICO (Jan. 21,
2010, 10:25 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2010/01/court-decision-opens-floodgatesfor-corporate-cash-031786 [https://perma.cc/R4AA-6QKT]; see also Michael R. Siebecker,
A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens United, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161,
193–95 (2010).
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would enable corporations to “marshal their power every day in
Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans.”16 In his 2010
State of the Union address, President Obama added that the ruling would
“open the floodgates for special interests, including foreign corporations, to
spend without limit in our elections.”17
To the extent that Citizens United provided corporations with doctrinal
rocket fuel, the more recent decision in McCutcheon v. FEC18 offered
corporations a political jet pack. In McCutcheon, after determining that
spending large sums of money on elections did not corrupt the political
process, the Court eliminated the prior cap19 on the total amount of
spending by one individual (or corporation) on all federal candidates and
political parties in an election cycle.20 Although the contribution limits per
candidate and party committee remain in place,21 corporations may now
give directly to as many political candidates and party organizations as
desired.22 With the number of candidates and committees extant in the
2016 election cycle, a corporation will therefore be able to increase its
aggregate direct candidate and party contributions from $123,000 to
$5,135,800.23 Working in tandem with the elimination of independent
political spending limits in Citizens United, the removal of aggregate caps
on direct candidate and political party spending in McCutcheon arms
corporations with a much more powerful political arsenal than average
citizens possess.24

16. Vogel, supra note 15; see also Siebecker, supra note 15, at 193–95.
17. Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on Campaign
Financing, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html [https://perma.cc/N3ME-ZBZR].
18. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
19. Prior to the rule, the limit per election cycle was approximately $123,000 per
person. See LAWRENCE NORDEN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FIVE TO
FOUR 9 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Five_to_Four_
Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/M55H-Y7D4].
20. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1438 (“Spending large sums of money in connection
with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an
officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the
possibility that an individual who spends large sums may garner ‘influence over or access to’
elected officials or political parties.” (quoting Citizens United v. FEC 558 U.S. 310, 359
(2010))).
21. See Marc E. Elias & Jonathan S. Berkon, After McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. F.
373, 377 (2016) (“The impact of the McCutcheon holding itself is relatively straightforward.
At the federal level, individuals may now donate the maximum amount to each candidate
($2,600 per election), political committee ($5,000 per year), state party ($10,000 per year),
and national party committee ($32,400 per year) without having to stay within aggregate
limits. The party committees are most likely to benefit from this change.”).
22. See NORDEN ET AL., supra note 19, at 10.
23. See id.
24. Elias & Berkon, supra note 21, at 374 (“Critics of the plurality view lament that it
will further empower wealthy individuals and large corporations at the expense of average
Americans. There is some truth to that contention. But under the current system, where
contributions to political parties are strictly limited but contributions to so-called ‘Super
PACs’ are not, wealthy individuals and large corporations already enjoy an outsized role.”).
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Obviously emboldened by the Supreme Court’s rulings, corporations
increasingly engage in massive amounts of political spending.25
Corporations currently spend approximately $2.6 billion per year on
political lobbying and “the biggest companies have upwards of 100
lobbyists representing them, allowing them to be everywhere, all the
time. . . . Of the 100 organizations that spend the most on lobbying, 95
consistently represent business.”26 A recent report by the Sunlight
Foundation27 revealed that 200 of the most politically active for-profit
corporations spent approximately $5.8 billion in lobbying and campaign
contributions during the six-year period comprising the 2008, 2010, and
2012 election cycles.28 In the 2014 election cycle alone, corporations spent
over $1.1 billion just on state candidates and committees.29 Estimates for
political advertising in the 2016 elections exceed $6 billion, with a vast
majority of those funds coming from corporate coffers.30 For those who
contend corporate involvement in politics sullies public discourse and
perverts political outcomes,31 the increasingly dominant presence of

25. Bill Allison & Sarah Harkins, Fixed Fortunes: Biggest Corporate Political Interests
Spend Billions, Get Trillions, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Nov. 17, 2014, 9:26 AM), http://
sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/11/17/fixed-fortunes-biggest-corporate-political-interestsspend-billions-get-trillions/ (“Between 2007 and 2012, 200 of America’s most politically
active corporations spent a combined $5.8 billion on federal lobbying and campaign
contributions.”) [https://perma.cc/G8QB-WLVS]; see also Michael Beckel, Top U.S.
Corporations Funneled $173 Million to Political Nonprofits, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY
(Jan. 16, 2014, 12:01 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/01/16/14107/top-uscorporations-funneled-173-million-political-nonprofits (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission ruling in 2010 did not, as some warned, unleash a
flood of corporate money directly into elections. But since then, scores of blue-chip U.S.
companies quietly bankrolled politically active nonprofits to the tune of at least $173 million
in roughly a single year, according to a new Center for Public Integrity investigation.”)
[https://perma.cc/784D-JM64].
26. Lee Drutman, How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered American Democracy,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/howcorporate-lobbyists-conquered-american-democracy/390822/ [https://perma.cc/4T2G-3S4J].
27. According to its mission statement, “The Sunlight Foundation is a national,
nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that uses technology, open data, policy analysis and
journalism to make our government and politics more accountable and transparent to all.”
Our Mission, SUNLIGHT FOUND., http://sunlightfoundation.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 14,
2017) [https://perma.cc/N5GE-P7H4].
28. See Allison & Harkins, supra note 25.
29. Bruce F. Freed & Marian Currinder, Do Political Business in the Daylight,
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 6, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/201604-06/corporate-money-is-playing-a-shadowy-role-in-2016-politics [https://perma.cc/2ZDCE97T].
30. Meg James, Political Ad Spending Estimated at $6 Billion in 2016, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-politicalad-spending-6-billion-dollars-in-2016-20151117-story.html [https://perma.cc/C9L5-GD3E].
31. See, e.g., Liz Kennedy, 10 Ways Citizens United Endangers Democracy, DEMOS
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.demos.org/publication/10-ways-citizens-united-endangersdemocracy [https://perma.cc/6HML-WNG4]; Mimi Murray Digby Marziani, Money in
Politics After Citizens United: Troubling Trends & Possible Solutions, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. (Apr. 18, 2012), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/money-politics-after-citizensunited-troubling-trends-possible-solutions [https://perma.cc/D8X6-EUL8].
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business interests in public elections risks a hostile corporate takeover of
American politics.32
2. Clandestine Corporate Spending
Perhaps animated by the hope of returns on political investment,33 yet
fearful of potential harm to their reputations from disclosing unpopular
political activity, many corporate executives find solace in secrecy.
According to some estimates, during the 2012 presidential election over
$300 million in political expenditures came from “dark money,”34 where
the source of the funds remains clandestine as a result of various regulatory
loopholes.35 Some estimate the amount of dark money in the 2016 election
cycle will exceed $600 million.36 The New York Times asserts that as of
May 2016, “two-thirds of political advertising dollars [in the 2016 election]
have largely come from anonymous corporate donations, funneled through
what have been referred to as ‘dark money’ nonprofit groups that freely
engage in electoral and legislative politics, but don’t have to disclose their
donors, expenditures or even their members.”37 While a recent study by the
32. Some suggest corporate political spending might actually enhance public discourse.
See Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein’s Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: An Approach to the
Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 589–90
(1991) (opposing prohibition of corporate political speech and emphasizing “the rationale
that corporate political speech adds to the open marketplace of ideas protected by the first
amendment”).
33. See Allison & Harkins, supra note 25.
34. Political
Nonprofits
(Dark
Money),
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://
www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/nonprof_summ.php (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) (“The
term ‘dark money’ is applied to this category of political spender because these groups do
not have to disclose the sources of their funding . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/2LGH-ACFH].
35. Id. (noting that the amount of dark money “[p]artly as a result [of] spending by
organizations that do not disclose their donors has increased from less than $5.2 million in
2006 to well over $300 million in the 2012 presidential cycle and more than $174 million in
the 2014 midterms”).
36. Albert R. Hunt, How Record Spending Will Affect 2016 Election, BLOOMBERG:
VIEW (Apr. 26, 2015, 10:56 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-04-26/howrecord-spending-will-affect-2016-election (“There was $300 million in dark money spent in
the last presidential race; there may be twice as much for 2016. These donors often are
looking for special favors or access, which wouldn’t be as easy to do if the spending were
reported openly.”) [https://perma.cc/QN74-5YKX]; see also Michael Beckel, What Is
Political “Dark Money”—And Is It Bad?, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 2, 2016, 3:00 AM),
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2016/01/20/19156/what-political-dark-money-and-it-bad
(“During the 2012 election cycle—the last time the presidency was at stake—dark money
groups pumped about $300 million into political messages that called for the election or
defeat of federal candidates, according to the nonpartisan Center for Responsive Politics.
Additionally, dark money groups spent hundreds of millions of dollars on political
advertisements that focused more on issues than candidates.”) [https://perma.cc/K4HY8Q5E].
37. Kathleen M. Donovan-Maher & Steven L. Groopman, Why Dark Money Is Bad
Business, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/10/opinion/whydark-money-is-bad-business.html [https://perma.cc/3T73-EW3F]; see also CTR. FOR
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY & ZICKLIN CTR. FOR BUS. ETHICS RESEARCH, THE 2015 CPAZICKLIN INDEX OF CORPORATE POLITICAL DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 9 (2015)
[hereinafter 2015 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX], http://files.politicalaccountability.net/index/CPAZicklin_Index_Final_with_links.pdf (“Despite popular concern, secret political spending
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Center for Public Accountability found that 9 of the S&P 500 companies
prohibit any kind of political spending, “there continues to be resistance to
disclosing payments to (c)(4) nonprofit organizations that are permitted to
conceal their donors.”38 Of course, the very nature of dark money, and the
convoluted political loopholes through which such funds are disseminated,
makes identifying the corporate source difficult to discern. Regardless of
that difficulty in detection, the point remains that to the extent corporations
remain free to skulk about the political arena injecting dark money into
campaigns under a cloak of anonymity, the electorate cannot effectively
assess whether politicians remain in the pocket of corporate interests and
shareholders cannot determine whether corporate managers use the
corporate treasury to advance personal political interests.39
Thus, even if participation by corporations in the political process might
produce some public benefits rather than civic harms,40 the lack of
transparency regarding corporate political activity presents a separate,
especially significant problem for shareholders,41 consumers,42 and other
continues to expand. ‘Dark money,’ referring to political funding that cannot be tracked
back to its first source, is expected to shatter prior records in the 2015–16 election cycle.”)
[https://perma.cc/TZE8-EQ6E].
38. 2015 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX, supra note 37, at 14.
39. See How Companies Spend, CTR. FOR POL. ACCOUNTABILITY, http://political
accountability.net/political-spending-information/how-do-companies-spend (last visited Apr.
14, 2017) (“Companies may also give unlimited sums to trade associations (called 501(c)(6)
groups for their tax code classification) and ‘social welfare’ organizations (called 501(c)(4)
groups). These tax-exempt groups must have a ‘primary purpose’ other than elections.
Unlike most political committees regulated by federal election law, they don’t have to
disclose their donors. Accordingly, corporate donors that wish to remain anonymous in their
giving may find these organizations appealing. The money these groups spend is often
referred to as ‘dark money’ because the funding sources are unknown. Much of this dark
money shapes both the political agenda and the making of policy. Its impact is seen on
climate change, tax breaks, redistricting, and growing income equality. ‘Such organizations
have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on campaign activities in recent elections while
declining to disclose their donors,’ noted Ken Doyle of BNA’s Money and Politics Report.
The bottom line: Dark money not only hurts our democracy; it also poses serious legal,
reputational and business risks to companies.”) [https://perma.cc/Q9WR-N27G].
40. See, e.g., Corporate Political Spending: A Resource, CONF. BOARD, https://
www.conference-board.org/politicalspending/ (last updated Jan. 6, 2016) (“[C]orporate
participation in the political process can be an important, and even essential, means of
enhancing shareholder value, strengthening corporate reputation and goodwill, and engaging
in good corporate citizenship.”) [https://perma.cc/SVV3-X86D].
41. John Coates, SEC Non-Decision Decision on Corporate Political Activity a Policy
and Political Mistake, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 13,
2013, 8:51 AM), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/12/13/secs-non-decision-decision-oncorporate-political-activity-a-policy-and-political-mistake/ (“Dozens of studies . . . support
the view that political activity can harm shareholder interests. These harms can flow through
many channels—from reputational harm to dilution of strategic focus, from politically risky
acquisition bets or capital investments to state laws deterring takeovers. To adequately
assess those risks, shareholders need basic, standardized information about political
activity—before investing, and afterwards, to monitor corporate performance and make
informed decisions.”) [https://perma.cc/85D5-QYER]; Lisa Gilbert, SEC Can Still Work on
a Corporate Political Disclosure Rule, HILL (Dec. 22, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://
thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/264036-sec-can-still-work-on-a-corporate-politicaldisclosure-rule (“The fact that corporate executives can spend company resources for
political purposes without shareholders’ knowledge raises significant investor protection and
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corporate constituencies.43 Essentially acknowledging the problems with
secret political activity by corporations, Justice Kennedy revealed an
appreciation for corporate transparency in his majority opinion in Citizens
United:
With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can
provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold
corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and
supporters. Shareholders can determine whether their corporation’s
political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making profits, and
citizens can see whether elected officials are “in the pocket” of so-called
moneyed interests.44

Whether in the context of securities sales or proxy statements to solicit
shareholder votes, transparency remains the primary tool employed by the
securities laws to combat corporate fraud.45 But without effective
transparency, “shareholders have no way to assess whether corporate
political spending benefits them, and [have] every reason to believe it is
fraught with risks to the corporate brand, business reputation, the bottom
line and, by extension, shareholder returns.”46
Notwithstanding Justice Kennedy’s hope for corporate transparency and
numerous concerted efforts to require corporations to disclose their political
spending,47 corporations currently face no such requirement under federal
corporate governance concerns. Investors should not be left in the dark as to whether
executives are spending funds on political causes that may run counter to shareholders’
interests.”) [https://perma.cc/EP6N-9JLF].
42. See infra Part I.B.2.
43. See IAN VANDEWALKER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, ELECTION SPENDING 2014:
OUTSIDE SPENDING IN SENATE RACES SINCE CITIZENS UNITED 15–17 (2015), https://
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Outside%20Spending%20Since%20Citiz
ens%20United.pdf [https://perma.cc/QU43-RFM9].
44. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93, 128 (2003)).
45. Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient Corporate
Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115, 117–18 (2009);
see also What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified June
10, 2013) (“Only through the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate
information can people make sound investment decisions. The result of this information
flow is a far more active, efficient, and transparent capital market that facilitates the capital
formation so important to our nation’s economy.”) [https://perma.cc/ZDR2-T4N4].
46. See Editorial, Keeping Shareholders in the Dark, supra note 7.
47. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on
Corporate Political Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923 (2013); Michael D. Guttentag, On
Requiring Public Companies to Disclose Political Spending, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 593;
Rebecca Ballhaus, Former SEC Officials Want Disclosure of Corporate Political
Donations, WALL ST. J.: WASH. WIRE (May 28, 2015, 6:10 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
washwire/2015/05/28/former-sec-officials-want-disclosure-of-corporate-political-donations/
[https://perma.cc/CLH8-UPF7]; see also Will Ardinger, Firms Should Disclose Political
Donations, CFA Says, CQ ROLL CALL, Sept. 5, 2014, 2014 WL 4377996 (discussing national
accounting organization calls for political disclosure rule); Peter Feltman, SEC Faces Calls
to Boost Political Spending Disclosure, CQ ROLL CALL, Apr. 25, 2015, 2015 WL 1652881
(regarding interest group pressure); Alexandra Higgins, Congressional Democrats Urge SEC
to Adopt Political Disclosure Rules, CQ ROLL CALL, Jan. 14, 2014, 2014 WL 128193
(regarding pressure from Congress for SEC disclosure rule); Sean McElwee & Liz Kennedy,
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or state law.48 To the contrary, current election law and securities
regulations permit corporations to engage in undisclosed political spending
in a variety of ways.49 As Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson
detailed in their seminal article “Shining Light on Corporate Political
Spending,” “public companies can, and do, engage in political spending that
is never disclosed by channeling that spending through intermediaries.”50
Even when some corporate spending is disclosed at the federal level—for
instance when the Federal Election Commission reports donors who make
direct contributions to particular candidates—the corporation itself does not
need to disclose direct political spending to shareholders.51 Although
academics,52 investors,53 market professionals,54 regulators,55 politicians,56
The SEC Should Shine a Light on Dark Political Donations from Corporations, WEEK
(July 24, 2014), http://theweek.com/articles/445073/sec-should-shine-light-dark-politicaldonations-from-corporations [https://perma.cc/C34K-DGYH]; Pamela Park, Former SEC
Leaders Push for Political Disclosure Rulemaking, WESTLAW CORP. GOVERNANCE DAILY
BRIEFING, 2015 WL 3403248 (mentioning a petition signed by 1.2 million people urging the
SEC to adopt a disclosure rule). But see Paul Atkins, Materiality: A Bedrock Principle
Protecting Legitimate Shareholder Interests Against Disguised Political Agendas, 3 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 363 (2013); Matthew Lepore, A Case for the Status Quo: Voluntary
Disclosure, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 413 (2013); J.W. Verret, The Securities Exchange Act Is a
Material Girl, Living in a Material World: A Response to Bebchuk and Jackson’s “Shining
Light on Corporate Political Spending,” 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 453 (2013); Eric
Hammesfahr, House Bill Protects Corporate Political Donations, CQ ROLL CALL, June 10,
2015, 2015 WL 3606637; Sean Parnell, Attacks on Political Donors Demonstrate Dangers
of Excessive Disclosure, CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POL. (July 28, 2011), http://
www.campaignfreedom.org/2011/07/28/attacks-on-political-donors-demonstrate-dangers-ofexcessive-disclosure/ [https://perma.cc/9JVY-HHJG].
48. See Steven Zuckerman, Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending: Problematic or
Pragmatic?, 1 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 89, 89 (2014).
49. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 47, at 930–38.
50. Id. at 930; see also Gilbert, supra note 41 (“Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission ruling, corporate political spending has
exploded—and much of it has been channeled through dark money conduits like nonprofits
and trade associations.”).
51. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 47, at 935 (“Existing election-law rules, such as
regulations promulgated by the Federal Election Commission (FEC), may require that
information about this type of corporate political spending be available in the public domain.
These rules, however, are designed to provide the public with information about the funding
sources for particular politicians—not to allow investors to assess whether public companies
are using shareholder money to advance political causes.”).
52. See Amy Biegelsen, Law Professors Ask SEC to Write New Political Donation
Disclosure Rules for Business, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM),
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/08/05/5583/law-professors-ask-sec-write-newpolitical-donation-disclosure-rules-business [https://perma.cc/XV9P-YKC7].
53. See Tim Devaney, Investors Urge Corporate Political Spending Disclosure, HILL
(May 20, 2015, 11:37 AM), http://thehill.com/regulation/business/242655-investors-pushsec-to-disclose-dark-money-in-politics [https://perma.cc/2H3U-6YKQ].
54. See Ardinger, supra note 47 (describing the national accounting organization’s
support).
55. Park, supra note 47 (regarding three former SEC leaders who urge adopting a
political disclosure rule).
56. See Andrew Ackerman, Senate Democrats Renew Push for Corporate Disclosure of
Political Spending, WALL ST. J.: WASH. WIRE (Jan. 21, 2016, 5:35 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/01/21/senate-democrats-renew-push-for-corporate-disclosureof-political-spending/ [https://perma.cc/7MMF-NVST].

2728

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

interest groups,57 and regular citizens58 have pressed the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt a mandatory disclosure rule for
corporations, the SEC has resisted59 and only recently asked for
commentary on a potential new political disclosure rule.60 To thwart any
progress the SEC might achieve, however, Congress passed an
appropriations bill in 2015 explicitly prohibiting the SEC from using funds
to “finalize, issue, or implement” a corporate political disclosure rule during
the upcoming year.61 In the absence of greater transparency regarding
corporate political activity, disdain from a variety of corporate and
stakeholder constituencies continues to grow.
B. Political Antitakeover Defenses and Failures
Despite a host of regulatory and grassroots efforts to require disclosure of
corporate political spending, corporations remain largely free to keep their
political activities closeted from public view. Nonetheless, the ardor with
which investors, consumers, and other corporate stakeholders clamor for
greater transparency makes the popular support for a corporate political
disclosure rule seem incredibly strong and the failure to implement that will
particularly problematic.

57. See Ben Goad, New Push for Disclosures on Corporate Giving, HILL (Sept. 4, 2014,
7:02 AM), http://thehill.com/regulation/finance/216736-new-push-for-corporate-givingdisclosure [https://perma.cc/NX7V-WRAA].
58. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Hindering the SEC from Shining a
Light on Political Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
12/22/business/dealbook/hindering-the-sec-from-shining-a-light-on-political-spending.html
(describing over 1.2 million comments received by the SEC regarding a proposed political
disclosure rule) [https://perma.cc/3VSM-D82Y].
59. Zach Carter, Congress Is About to Make Citizens United Even Worse, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 16, 2015, 11:17 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sec-disclosurepolitical-spending_us_56717f55e4b0648fe301a84c (“‘[SEC Chairman] Mary Jo White has
spent more than two years alternatively throwing shade at political disclosure rules and
actively hindering their completion,’ said Jeff Hauser, who runs the Revolving Door Project
at the Center for Effective Government. ‘Mary Jo White gave Congressional Republicans an
opportunity to give corporate America a free pass to buy elections and public policy
discreetly.’”) [https://perma.cc/83T4-T8L9]; Sarah Schweppe, How Are Big Businesses
Buying U.S. Elections?, CHEAT SHEET (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.cheatsheet.com/
politics/how-is-big-business-buying-u-s-elections.html (“At a recent congressional hearing,
SEC Chair Mary Jo White responded to a legislator who asked why the SEC had not made
disclosing this kind of political spending a law with her usual rhetoric that it’s not the most
important issue to the commission, according to the New York Times. According to
Reuters, in the past, she has said she opposes writing rules to exert ‘societal pressures on
companies.’”) [https://perma.cc/86KX-M4QY]; see also Matthew Garza, SEC Rulemaking:
Light at the End of the Mandated Tunnels, in 2015 YEAR IN REVIEW: TRENDS AND
DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LAW 1, 3–4 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 2016).
60. Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, Securities Act
Release No. 10064, Exchange Act Release No. 77599, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916 (Apr. 22, 2016).
61. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-13, § 707, 129 Stat.
2242, 2273–74. The bill includes a ban on the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issuing
disclosure rules affecting 501(c)(4) nonprofit groups. See id.

2017]

POLITICAL INSIDER TRADING

2729

1. Shareholder Activism
Because a corporation’s political activity remains a material
consideration to many investors in making their purchasing decisions,62
shareholders get particularly piqued when corporations keep their political
activity closeted.63 In light of the fundamental duty of loyalty that
corporate managers owe to shareholders, disclosure of political
contributions represents an essential mechanism to ensure board
accountability.64 Investors remain concerned that corporate assets are being
used to advance the personal interests of corporate managers rather than the
interests of shareholders.65 Perhaps as a result, in the last proxy season, the
most common shareholder proposals targeted corporate lobbying and
political spending.66 Especially in light of recent academic studies
demonstrating that corporate political spending does not enhance
shareholder wealth,67 shareholders demand that managers account for how
62. See Corporate Political Spending:
Shareholder Activity, CONF. BOARD
(Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.conference-board.org/politicalspending/index.cfm?id=6256
(“Shareholders continue to seek increased transparency with respect to a company’s political
activities and the potential legal and reputational risks such activities may create.
Additionally, shareholders want to ensure that decisions regarding corporate political activity
have strong board oversight. Therefore, shareholder proposals calling for corporate political
spending transparency allow the shareholder to monitor and hold executives accountable and
ensure that a nexus exists between the political activity and the shareholders’ interests.”)
[https://perma.cc/K2HN-XJUA].
63. See MARC GOLDSTEIN, INV’R RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH INST., DEFINING
ENGAGEMENT: AN UPDATE ON THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHAREHOLDERS,
DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVES (2014), https://irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
engagement-between-corporations-and-investors-at-all-time-high1.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM
3K-6FTM]; Robert Kelner et al., Responding to Corporate Political Disclosure Initiatives:
Guide for In-House Counsel, 23 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Mar.–Apr. 2015, 2015 WL
5616354 (“A company that has received a political spending shareholder proposal also
should consider initiating a dialogue with the shareholder regarding the proposal. This
would demonstrate that the company is focused on enhancing shareholder value and
maintaining an open dialogue with shareholders.”).
64. Mara Lemos Stein & Maxwell Murphy, Investors Push for Fuller Picture of
Corporate Political Contributions, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2016, 9:38 PM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/investors-push-for-fuller-picture-of-corporate-political-contributions1459820285 (“Investors, however, are demanding a fuller picture of companies’ political
giving and lobbying efforts. . . . Investors aren’t necessarily looking to end corporate
involvement in politics, but some of them want to make sure it is aligned with a company’s
stated goals, and say disclosure will bolster accountability.”) [https://perma.cc/R3BTVR8H]; Skroupa, supra note 15; see also HEIDI WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, PROXY
PREVIEW, PROXY PREVIEW 2016: HELPING SHAREHOLDERS VOTE THEIR VALUES 35–42
(2016), www.proxypreview.org/Proxy-Preview-2016.pdf (describing the high number of
shareholder proxy resolutions dedicated to disclosure of corporate political activity)
[https://perma.cc/HU4K-UZ67].
65. See Kwak, supra note 6; see also Coates, supra note 41.
66. See GIBSON DUNN, SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE 2015
PROXY SEASON 1 (2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/ShareholderProposal-Developments-During-the-2015-Proxy-Season.pdf (stating that the most common
2015 shareholder proposal topics, along with the approximate number of proposals
submitted were political and lobbying activities (110 proposals), proxy access (108
proposals), and independent chair (76 proposals)) [https://perma.cc/SCK8-2YJN].
67. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 5, at 658; Michael Hadani, Comment Letter on Petition
to Require Public Companies to Disclose to Shareholders the Use of Corporate Resources
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political spending promotes stated corporate values and business goals.68
Moreover, when corporations engage in unwanted or indefensible political
activity, shareholder hackles quickly get raised.69 For instance, CVS was
accused of proxy fraud by one of its largest institutional investors based on
a purported gross incongruity between the company’s publicly espoused
values in its proxy statement and the company’s political expenditures.70
To take another example, a coalition of investors recently demanded the
resignation of two board members of WellPoint, a health insurance
company, for its funding of “Stand Your Ground” legislation.71 As one
prominent investor advocate commented, “Not only is this a reputational
risk but a financial calamity—imagine paying for the health costs from gun
injuries and deaths.”72 When corporate politics fail to align with investor
preferences, investors properly fault the board, and corporate profitability
hangs precariously in the balance.73 Without adequate political disclosure
of political activity, however, it remains impossible to hold corporate
managers accountable for any transgressions of their fundamental fiduciary
duties.
Clandestine corporate political spending not only undermines board
accountability but also threatens the quickly burgeoning market in socially
responsible investing (SRI).74 Although the definition of SRI remains
for Political Activities 2–3 (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/46378.pdf [https://perma.cc/CF7M-9NHV].
68. See Mara Lemos Stein, Corporate Political Spending Becomes Compliance Issue,
WALL ST. J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Mar. 3, 2016, 11:29 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
riskandcompliance/2016/03/03/corporate-political-spending-becomes-compliance-issue/
(“‘What we are asking for in disclosure is that a company be upfront and explain why such
spending is important’ for the company’s strategy, said Timothy Smith, director of
environmental social and governance shareowner engagement at Walden Asset
Management, a part of Boston Trust & Investment Management Co., which has
approximately $2.7 billion of assets under management.”) [https://perma.cc/5EFC-MSJW];
see also Eduardo Porter, Corporations Open Up About Political Spending, N.Y. TIMES
(June 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/business/corporations-open-up-aboutpolitical-spending.html (quoting the New York State Comptroller, stating that
“[s]hareholders need transparency in order to determine whether corporate political spending
benefits the company’s long-term value”) [https://perma.cc/TTD8-XA3D].
69. See Lemos Stein, supra note 68 (“‘Companies need to think strategically about these
issues,’ said Zachary Parks, special counsel in Covington & Burling’s Washington D.C.
office. ‘Companies that ignore disclosure initiatives have been the target of shareholder
resolutions, bad press and lawsuits. But kitchen-sink disclosure isn’t risk free.’ In an email,
Mr. Parks said that at times, disclosure also can lead to litigation or negative ‘name-andshame’ publicity. Establishing disclosure processes can be expensive, so companies need to
weigh their particular risks and ‘see around the corner as to where this process is going.’”).
70. Pamela Park, Shareholder Calls CVS Political Spending Incongruent with Values,
WESTLAW CORP. GOVERNANCE DAILY BRIEFING, Apr. 3, 2015, 2015 WL 1487121.
71. Skroupa, supra note 15.
72. Id. (quoting AFL-CIO counsel Robert E. McGarrah).
73. Adam Skaggs, Brennan Center for Justice, Comment Letter on Petition to Require
Public Companies to Disclose to Shareholders the Use of Corporate Resources for Political
Activities (Dec. 21, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-20.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TB4R-CFQL].
74. See Jennifer Woods, Doing Well While Doing Good: Socially Responsible
Investing, CNBC (Sept. 24, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/24/doing-wellwhile-doing-good-socially-responsible-investing.html [https://perma.cc/3NHP-GHTC].
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somewhat protean, the desire “to achieve long-term competitive financial
returns together with positive societal impact”75 reflects a typical strategy.
Regardless of the definitional imprecision, investors increasingly make their
stock purchasing decisions based in part on a variety of social,
environmental, governance, and political criteria.76 As of 2015, investment
managers of assets valued at over $45 trillion have signed the United
Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, an international compact
whereby signatories pledge to screen investments based on various
environmental, social, and governance issues.77 In the United States alone,
the amount of assets under management employing SRI strategies increased
76 percent from 2012 to 2014, representing over $6.5 trillion under
professional management.78 Although the SEC has traditionally held the
view that mandatory disclosure of social data (including corporate political
spending) remains outside the bailiwick of appropriate rulemaking, the
agency recently acknowledged that investors pay increasing attention to
social data in determining whether to buy or sell a company’s stock.79 One
recent study from BlackRock, the largest investment manager, with over
$4.6 trillion in assets under management, concluded an inextricable link
exists between social responsibility and financial performance:
ESG [(environmental, social, and governance)] factors cannot be divorced
from financial analysis. We view a strong ESG record as a mark of
operational and management excellence. Companies that score high on
ESG measures tend to quickly adapt to changing environmental and social
trends, use resources efficiently, have engaged (and, therefore,

75. USSIF FOUND., REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT INVESTING
TRENDS 2014, at 12, http://www.ussif.org/Files/Publications/SIF_Trends_14.F.ES.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7EAT-X9ZF].
76. Jeff Benjamin, Socially Responsible Investing Is Coming of Age, INVESTMENTNEWS
(Mar. 6, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160306/FREE/16030
9960/socially-responsible-investing-is-coming-of-age [https://perma.cc/G8K7-NENU].
77. UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, IMPACT: TRANSFORMING BUSINESS, CHANGING
THE WORLD 40 (2015), https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/publications/ImpactUN
GlobalCompact2015.pdf (“The PRI is a global network of investors working together to put
six principles for responsible investment into practice . . . . The PRI commits signatories to
incorporate environmental, social and governance issues into investment decision-making
and ownership practices. It has 1,325 signatories representing 45 trillion USD assets under
management.”) [https://perma.cc/MSP4-YKJ9].
78. USSIF FOUND., supra note 75, at 12.
79. See Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, Securities Act
Release No. 10064, Exchange Act Release No. 77599, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916 (Apr. 22, 2016)
(“[T]he Commission has recognized that the task of identifying what information is material
to an investment and voting decision is a continuing one in the field of securities regulation.
The role of sustainability and public policy information in investors’ voting and investment
decisions may be evolving as some investors are increasingly engaging on certain ESG
[(environmental, social, or governance)] matters. According to one study, investors are more
likely to engage registrants on sustainability issues than on financial results or transactions
and corporate strategy. One observer expressed the view that ESG is not only a public
policy issue but also a financial issue, noting a positive correlation between a ‘strong ESG
record’ and excellence in operations and management.”).
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productive) employees, and face lower risks of regulatory fines or
reputational damage.80

To the extent investors deem corporate political activity material to a
decision to purchase or sell a company’s stock, disclosure of political
spending seems necessary to provide adequate information to the public.
The lack of transparency in corporate political activity presents a
significant threat to the basic viability of the market for SRI.81 In an
efficient market, investors should reward companies that embrace desired
socially responsible business practices by paying a premium in stock price
or offering cheaper access to capital.82 To the extent the premium exceeds
the cost of compliance, both corporations and the SRI community gain.83
Sustaining the market for SRI necessarily requires transparency in corporate
practices and communications,84 for it would be wholly irrational for
investors to pay a premium for stock in purportedly socially responsible
companies if corporations conceal their actual business practices or actively
dissemble.85 Thus, regardless of the incentives for invisibility corporations
might perceive, permitting corporations to conceal political activities that
investors deem material to their purchasing decisions threatens the viability
of the $45 trillion market for corporate social responsibility86 and
ineluctably undermines the efficient operation of the capital markets.87
2. Consumer and Community Retaliation
In addition to shareholders, consumers and other stakeholders take
seriously a corporation’s political spending and activities. When Target
faced a consumer boycott by nearly a quarter million consumers following
the company’s $150,000 contribution to MN Forward, a group supporting a
gubernatorial candidate opposed to same-sex marriage,88 Target quickly
80. BLACKROCK INV. INST., THE PRICE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (2015), https://
www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/literature/whitepaper/bii-pricing-climate-risk-us.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KWD4-E3CY].
81. See Siebecker, supra note 15, at 185–89; see also Alex Edmans & David J. Vogel,
Does Socially Responsible Investing Make Financial Sense?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2016,
10:18 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/does-socially-responsible-investing-make-financialsense-1456715888 (“For many investors, socially responsible investing is now a guiding
principle. The number of mutual funds and exchange-traded funds catering to those
investors has mushroomed in recent years, with industry heavyweights BlackRock Inc. and
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. prominent among those launching funds last year.”)
[https://perma.cc/TXL6-C9NB].
82. See Michael R. Siebecker, Bridging Troubled Waters: Linking Corporate Efficiency
and Political Legitimacy Through a Discourse Theory of the Firm, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 103, 106
(2014).
83. Id.
84. See Siebecker, supra note 45, at 117–18.
85. See generally James Kwak, Corporate Law Constraints on Political Spending, 18
N.C. BANKING INST. 251 (2013) (arguing that investors should file shareholder derivative
suits to challenge political spending allegedly harmful to the corporation).
86. See UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 77, at 40.
87. See Siebecker, supra note 45, at 117–18.
88. Bruce Watson, Target Boycott Expands Amid Confusion About Protest Goals, AOL
(Aug. 6, 2010, 7:16 PM), https://www.aol.com/article/2010/08/06/target-boycott-expands-
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apologized to placate disgruntled consumers.89 Perhaps proving that no
good deed goes unpunished, four years later when Target filed briefs
supporting same-sex marriage in various court cases, the company faced a
boycott from consumers on the opposite end of the political spectrum.90 Of
course, Target is not the only company to face threats to profitability due to
unwanted corporate activity.91 A 2010 Harris poll revealed that almost half
of those surveyed would not purchase products or services from a business
that contributed to a political candidate or cause they opposed.92 More
generally, a 2013 study of American consumers revealed that 42 percent
had boycotted in the past year a company’s products or services based on
corporate misconduct and that 88 percent of consumers suggested they
would boycott a company’s products if they learned the company had
engaged in irresponsible or deceptive behavior.93
Although directors and officers owe no fiduciary duties to
nonshareholders, corporate managers cannot rationally fulfill their fiduciary
duties without taking into account the effects business decisions might have
on consumers and other corporate constituencies (e.g., employees,
suppliers, and members of the community in which a corporation operates)
whose reactions to instances of corporate political activity might threaten
profitability.94 Perhaps as a result, some corporations have embraced
voluntary disclosure protocols for corporate political spending.95 A 2015
amid-confusion-about-protest-goals/19584033/ [https://perma.cc/EGT7-VWXW]; see Sara
Yin, MoveOn.Org Calls for Target Boycott in New Ad (VIDEO), HUFFINGTON POST
(May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/17/boycott-target-commercial_n_
684815.html [https://perma.cc/XQQ5-VCAE].
89. Brody Mullins & Ann Zimmerman, Target Discovers Downside to Political
Contributions, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748703988304575413650676561696 [https://perma.cc/QW9V-ZQG3].
90. Charlie Butts, Target Customers Can Prove the Cost of Attacking Marriage,
ONENEWSNOW (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.onenewsnow.com/culture/2014/08/08/targetcustomers-can-prove-the-cost-of-attacking-marriage#.U-TZ3vldWbM [https://perma.cc/HB
D3-FHV2]; see also Brian Tashman, For Conservatives, Boycotts Are Noble Efforts When
They Support Them, Otherwise It’s ‘Economic Terrorism,’ RIGHTWINGWATCH (Aug. 8,
2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.rightwingwatch.org/content/conservatives-boycotts-are-nobleefforts-when-they-support-them-otherwise-its-economic-terro#sthash.I9nJRruK.dpuf
(describing various boycott movements following political positions taken by corporations)
[https://perma.cc/877R-CNUX].
91. For another example involving shareholders, see Mallory E. Mendrala, Citizens
Divided by Citizens United: How the Recent Supreme Court Decisions Affects Small
Business in Politics, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 253, 277–79 (2012).
92. See AS YOU SOW, 2014 SHAREHOLDER RESOLUTION: DOW CHEMICAL CORPORATE
POLITICAL SPENDING (2014), http://www.asyousow.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/
dow2014gmos.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RME-8N6X].
93. CONE COMMC’NS, 2013 CONE COMMUNICATIONS SOCIAL IMPACT STUDY: THE NEXT
CAUSE EVOLUTION 18–19 (2013), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56b4a7472
b8dde3df5b7013f/t/5742663b60b5e9c9768217c6/1463969372013/100113_CauseEvolution_
small.pdf [https://perma.cc/559T-CNHC].
94. See Siebecker, supra note 82, at 148–51 (2014); see also Siebecker, supra note 15,
at 224.
95. Charles Nathan, Communicating Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Political
Spending, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 28, 2014),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/07/28/communicating-voluntary-disclosure-ofcorporate-political-spending/ [https://perma.cc/395S-HCMV].
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joint study by the Center for Political Accountability and the Wharton
School of Business found that 126 companies in the S&P 50096 have
adopted some meaningful political activity disclosure and accountability
policies,97 including 9 companies that impose outright bans on engaging in
any sort of political spending.98 The driving force for that that transparency
(and bans on corporate spending for a very few companies) is effective risk
management, whether through diminished threat of litigation, consumer ire,
or investor agitation.99 Engaging consumers and other stakeholders through
effective discourse prior to pursuing any particular political activity can
work to prevent deleterious market effects from corporate managers who
blithely advance unpopular political commitments.100
Even as more companies embrace the benefits of voluntary transparency,
however, a mandatory disclosure rule remains necessary to eradicate the
perverse incentives for corporations to pursue duplicitous branding. The
basic concern lies in the ability of corporations to curry consumer favor for
some purported values without actually embracing those commitments.
The Volkswagen defeat device scandal provides a helpful example.101
Although Volkswagen purported to market “clean diesel” automobiles that
appealed to consumers concerned about the environment,102 Volkswagen
installed a carbon-detection cheating device in eleven million of its
vehicles.103 With those defeat devices in place, the company could conceal
that its purportedly environmentally friendly vehicles emitted far more
pollution than claimed.104 When this cheating device was eventually
discovered, Volkswagen suffered greatly for its dissembling,105 with some
96. For a description of the S&P 500 Index, see S&P 500, S&P DOW JONES INDICES,
http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-500 (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
RAG7-JETY].
97. See 2015 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX, supra note 37, at 23.
98. Id. at 18.
99. CONFERENCE BD., HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY: EMERGING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES 21–24 (2010), http://files.cfpa.gethifi.com/reports/cpareports/handbook-on-corporate-political-activity-emerging-governance-issues/Handbook_
FINAL_Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/85R2-7LZQ]; Lemos Stein & Murphy, supra note 64
(“‘Disclosure, board oversight and robust compliance are intertwined and an integral part of
enterprise risk management of political spending,’ said Bruce Freed, president and founder
of the CPA, which advocates greater disclosure of such spending.”).
100. For a detailed discussion of the advantages of robust dialogue among corporate
managers, consumers, and other corporate stakeholders, see Siebecker, supra note 15, at
224–25.
101. Guilbert Gates et al., How Volkswagen Has Grappled with Its Diesel Scandal, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/international/vwdiesel-emissions-scandal-explained.html [https://perma.cc/PW6U-J73R].
102. Jeff S. Bartlett et al., Guide to the Volkswagen Emissions Recall, CONSUMER
REP. (Jan. 6, 2017), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/cars/guide-to-the-volkswagendieselgate-emissions-recall- (“Volkswagen lied to us. Its 11 million ‘clean diesel’ cars have
been polluting the air at up to 40 times the federal standard for years.”)
[https://perma.cc/YTM8-J3EL].
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Marta Tellado, Will Volkswagen’s Penalty Be High Enough?, CNN (Sept. 24, 2015,
6:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/24/opinions/tellado-volkswagen-scandal/ (“Let’s be
clear—not every violation of consumers’ rights is perfectly black and white, but this one
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current estimates of total liability for the company exceeding $35 billion.106
Some might argue that the punishment Volkswagen continues to endure
reflects proper functioning of market forces. When the fraud was
discovered, consumers, investors, regulators, and law enforcement officials
responded with swift rebuke.107 But that insight misses the basic point that
it is the very ability to detect the fraud—even if only after elaborate
study108 in the case of the Volkswagen cheat device—that allows market
forces to work at all.
In the context of corporate dark money, the inability to detect the source
of the contributions makes it extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, for
the market to detect when corporations behave in a way wholly inconsistent
with their purported values.109 That inability to verify the cohesion
between the projected brand image and actual corporate action provides
companies with a perverse incentive to play both sides of the fence. For
instance, when North Carolina passed House Bill 2, prohibiting transgender
individuals from using a bathroom designated for the gender other than
found on their birth certificate,110 thirty-six corporate executives from S&P
500 companies spoke out against the measure as contrary their
corporation’s core values.111 Yet according to the Center for Political
Accountability, those same corporations contributed heavily to a powerful
political committee that helped elect the very same legislature responsible
for the transgender bathroom law.112 Although that example marks an
clearly is. The emissions manipulation was intentional. The advertising was false. The
scope of the fraud was profound.”) [https://perma.cc/YJ54-GD8X].
106. Ross Kaplan, “Told ‘Ya So” on VW’s Projected Liability from Emissions Scandal,
CITY LAKES REAL EST. BLOG (Jan. 5, 2016), http://rosskaplan.com/2016/01/told-ya-so-onvws-projected-liability-from-emissions-scandal/ [https://perma.cc/CH49-YLJD]. But see
Kalina Oroschakoff & Nicholas Hirst, VW Is Winning, at Least in Europe, POLITICO (July
27, 2016, 6:19 AM), http://www.politico.eu/article/vw-is-winning-at-least-in-europebrussels-cars-emissions-tests-cheat/ (providing an even higher estimate and stating, “Some
8.4 million diesel cars in Europe are affected by the scandal, compared to fewer than half a
million in the U.S., putting the total cost of a similar deal at well more than $250 billion,
roughly twice the GDP of the city of Berlin”) [https://perma.cc/9PJK-3B3Z].
107. Geoffrey Smith & Roger Parloff, Hoaxwagen, FORTUNE (Mar. 7, 2016, 6:30 AM),
http://fortune.com/inside-volkswagen-emissions-scandal/ [https://perma.cc/ZAG5-7JL2].
108. Sonari Glinton, How a Little Lab in West Virginia Caught Volkswagen’s Big Cheat,
NPR (Sept. 24, 2015, 5:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/09/24/443053672/how-a-littlelab-in-west-virginia-caught-volkswagens-big-cheat [https://perma.cc/EG5K-YK38].
109. See Nathan, supra note 95 (“A patchwork of laws and regulations currently exists
that require public disclosure of only certain kinds of corporate political contributions. This
system is not only unwieldy to access, but also fails to account for political contributions
made to 501(c)(4) and 527 organizations and to third parties such as trade associations, for
which no contribution limits exist and no company disclosure is legally required. The lack
of mandatory disclosure of these types of contributions have led many critics to characterize
the recipients as ‘black money pools,’ that operate in the shadows of the political process and
keep investors and the public in the dark about how corporate funds are being used and
which candidates and issues are being supported.”).
110. H.B. 2, 2016 Leg., 2d Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016).
111. See Political Spending and Unintended Consequences, CTR. FOR
POL. ACCOUNTABILITY, http://politicalaccountability.net/reports/political-spending-andunintended-consequences (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/W7QG-H9YQ].
112. Id.
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instance of corporate hypocrisy that eventually came to light, not all
corporate political contributions remain traceable or subject to public
reporting.113 As a result, corporations face an incentive to project political
images that appeal to consumers while taking wholly contrary political
actions, perhaps simply to advance the personal interest of corporate
managers.114 That incentive only exists, however, if corporate political
spending remains secret. Shedding light on corporate political activity
would prevent corporations from engaging in false political branding by
allowing the market to punish hypocrisy wherever it arises.
3. Democratic Discontent
Clandestine corporate political spending flies in the face of popular will
and signals a corruption of politics that is well underway. A September
2015 Bloomberg poll revealed that 80 percent of Republicans and 83
percent of Democrats believe Citizens United should be overturned.115
Although the Supreme Court remains insulated from popular opinion, the
poll reflects widespread discontent with the ability of corporations to
dominate the political process. Along those lines, a 2015 Public Policy
Polling survey of primary voters reported that 88 percent of Democrats as
well as 88 percent of Republicans want the SEC to promulgate a rule
requiring corporations to disclose their political spending.116 Despite the
concerted efforts of academics, advocacy groups, nonprofit organizations,
and ordinary citizens,117 the SEC has to date resisted issuing a disclosure
rule targeting corporate political spending.118 And even if the SEC were
otherwise inclined, Congress included a provision in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act prohibiting the SEC from promulgating any disclosure
requirement on corporate political activities in 2016.119 What seems so
113. See Nathan, supra note 95.
114. Liz Kennedy, Top 5 Ways Citizens United Harms Democracy & Top 5 Ways We’re
Fighting to Take Democracy Back, DEMOS (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.demos.org/
publication/top-5-ways-citizens-united-harms-democracy-top-5-ways-we%E2%80%99refighting-take-democracy-back (“When political spenders can hide behind meaningless—or
worse, misleading—names, it robs voters of information they need to assess political
messages. Corporate donors can prevent ‘citizens and shareholders [from reacting] to the
speech of corporate entities in a proper way’ by cloaking their political spending through
conduit organizations that disguise their true identity and agendas.”) [https://perma.cc/
YRX7-D6RB].
115. Greg Stohr, Bloomberg Poll: Americans Want Supreme Court to Turn Off Political
Spending Spigot, BLOOMBERG:
POLITICS (Sept. 28, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-09-28/bloomberg-poll-americans-want-supremecourt-to-turn-off-political-spending-spigot [https://perma.cc/3N9G-C8NS].
116. Lydia Wheeler, Poll Shows Bipartisan Voter Support for Corporate Giving Rule,
HILL (Sept. 28, 2015, 10:27 AM), http://thehill.com/regulation/255128-poll-showsbipartisan-voter-support-for-corporate-giving-rule [https://perma.cc/K8ZZ-75W7].
117. See supra notes 52–58 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
119. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 707, 129 Stat.
2242, 2273–74. The bill also includes a ban on the IRS issuing disclosure rules affecting
501(c)(4) nonprofit groups. See id.; see also R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41542, THE STATE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES FOR
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odd—if not overtly suspicious—is that despite widespread popular
discontent with corporate involvement in the political process and
enormous support for imposing on corporations a disclosure obligation
regarding their political activities, elected officials seem dedicated to
protecting corporate secrecy. Such gross incongruity between clearly
expressed popular will and the actions of our elected representatives over
the issue of corporate transparency suggests our political processes might
already suffer corporate corruption at the core. At the very least, corporate
influences seem to have muted millions of voices screaming to be heard.
As some of the most important decisions affecting our daily lives get
made behind boardroom doors rather than in the public sphere, secret
political spending exacerbates the problem of ignoring popular will by
turning notions of robust democratic accountability into a delusional
dream.120 The largest 100 public companies in the world have a combined
market capitalization in excess of $16 trillion,121 with 53 of those
companies located in the United States.122 The economic power under the
control of just those fifty-three domestic companies trumps the economic
influence of many nation-states.123 With that great economic might, giant
corporations have supplanted traditional governmental institutions in
providing some of the most important rulemaking, adjudicative, and
security functions.124 Moreover, with the advent of the corporate social
responsibility movement and the need to develop new markets to expand
productivity,125 corporations have also become more deeply engaged in
shaping public mores and social attitudes as well.126 Because corporations
take such a proactive role in molding our collective identities, “[c]orporate
internal governance issues, once considered strictly economic and confined
to internal corporate stakeholders, have been broadened to include social
and political issues and the concerns of outside stakeholders beyond the
CONGRESS 14 (2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41542.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3563ZJQ].
120. For a full discussion of the growing influence of corporations in our economic,
political, and social lives, see Siebecker, supra note 15, at 169–79.
121. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, GLOBAL TOP 100 COMPANIES BY MARKET
CAPITALISATION 6 (2015), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/audit-services/capital-market/
publications/assets/document/pwc-global-top-100-march-update.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3U
Z-TGQA].
122. Id. at 7.
123. See Siebecker, supra note 15 at 171.
124. See Allison D. Garrett, The Corporation as Sovereign, 60 ME. L. REV. 129, 132
(2008) (“[T]he distinction between corporations and the state is blurring, not only
internationally, but also domestically, as corporations act in ways that make them similar to
nation-states. The nation-state is not dead, but it is evolving. A pivotal factor in this
evolution is the power of the world’s largest corporations. Like the vassal whose power
overshadows the king’s, these companies act similarly to traditional nation-states in some
ways. They have tremendous economic power, establish security forces, engage in
diplomatic, adjudicatory and ‘legislative’ activities, and influence monetary policy.”); see
also Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1308–09 (2003).
125. Trevor Goddard, Corporate Citizenship: Creating Social Capacity in Developing
Countries, 15 DEV. PRAC. 433, 433 (2005).
126. Id.
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regulatory authority of the chartering state.”127 Quite simply, democratic
legitimacy of our polity remains inextricably linked to the legitimacy of
corporate governance mechanisms. Without adequate transparency, we
cannot begin to hold corporations accountable in any of the economic,
social, and political realms they increasingly dominate. Thus, especially in
light of the enormous influence of corporations in all aspects of our daily
lives, if corporations remain capable of operating in the shadows, the
bedrock principle of democratic accountability becomes severely
jeopardized.128
In addition to threatening important notions of democratic and political
accountability, clandestine corporate spending undermines effective
discourse. In Doe v. Reed,129 a case in which the Supreme Court denied the
claim of political petition signatories to remain anonymous, Justice Antonin
Scalia noted:
Requiring people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic
courage, without which democracy is doomed. For my part, I do not look
forward to a society which, thanks to the Supreme Court, campaigns
anonymously[,] . . . hidden from public scrutiny and protected from the
accountability of criticism. This does not resemble the Home of the
Brave.130

Although the Supreme Court has protected the right to anonymous political
speech in certain circumstances, the justifications for anonymity typically
center on the speaker’s fear of repression, retribution, or harassment.131 No
such concerns would seem plausible for the increasingly powerful modern
corporation. Although in Citizens United the Supreme Court rejected the
notion that the extreme wealth of corporations necessarily corrupts the
political process, transparency provided the essential justification for
unfettered corporate spending.132 Quite simply, we cannot trust the
motivations of corporations engaging in political discourse without
transparency. In an organizational structure governed by fiduciary duties,
trust and transparency go hand in hand.133 Moreover, without knowing the
identity of the corporate speaker, we cannot engage in the meaningful
dialectic discourse necessary to sustain the trust that arguably provides the
sole motivation for corporations to engage in political speech on
shareholders’ behalf.

127. Larry Cata Backer, The Private Law of Public Law: Public Authorities as
Shareholders, Golden Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the Public Law Element in
Private Choice of Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1801, 1807 (2008).
128. See Ian Vandewalker, Scalia on Democracy Without Disclosure, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/scalia-democracy-withoutdisclosure [https://perma.cc/4P5B-KDFF].
129. 561 U.S. 186 (2010).
130. Id. at 228 (Scalia, J., concurring).
131. See, e.g., Anonymity, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/
anonymity (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/QQ6F-JJRZ].
132. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010).
133. For an elaborate defense of the need for transparent discourse among corporate
managers, shareholders, consumers, and other stakeholders, see Siebecker, supra note 45.
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Thus, with the growing dominance of corporations in the political sphere,
the lack of adequate transparency regarding corporate political activity
necessary to satisfy investors and consumers, and inherent suspicions about
the motives of corporate executives in using corporate treasuries to advance
their personal political preferences, a robust political spending disclosure
rule seems essential to ensure the integrity of the capital markets and the
legitimacy of democratic processes. Congress, state governments, and
federal agencies, however, have failed to articulate a coherent disclosure
rule and corporations have not sufficiently embraced disclosure voluntarily.
Nonetheless, existing disclosure principles embedded within insider trading
law could offer a solution. Just as the basic fiduciary principles of trust that
animate insider trading doctrine require corporate insiders either to disclose
to the market material nonpublic information prior to trading or abstain
from trading altogether, those same basic fiduciary principles could require
corporate managers to disclose to the market material political spending or
abstain from political activity altogether. At its root, the fiduciary duty of
trust binding officers and directors to the company and its shareholders
remains the same regardless of whether the context of its application is
insider trading or some other area of corporate governance. The only
question is whether the disclosure obligation that the Supreme Court
recognized as an essential component of the fiduciary duty of trust in the
context of insider trading would apply equally well to the context of
political spending.
II. THE FIDUCIARY FRAMEWORK OF INSIDER TRADING
Understanding whether the disclosure obligation embedded in the
Supreme Court’s insider trading doctrine should similarly compel
corporations to disclose their political spending requires a brief explication
of the evolution of the basic fiduciary framework for insider trading
prohibitions. Of course, this examination does not delve deeply into every
facet of insider trading because the point is simply to ascertain how
transferrable the basic disclosure obligation within the insider trading
context might be to instances of corporate political spending.
A. Foundations of the Disclosure Obligation
Although insider trading prohibitions rest upon the statutory foundation
of federal securities laws,134 the Supreme Court specifies the content of
insider trading doctrine based on basic common law fiduciary principles
governing the actions of corporate managers.135 The omnibus securities
fraud prohibitions contained in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934136 and the corresponding SEC Rule 10b-5137 nonetheless provide
the jurisprudential springboard for the development of insider trading
134.
135.
136.
137.

See Kim, supra note 1, at 854–56.
See Nagy, supra note 2, at 1323–33.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016).
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principles. Those provisions, which grew out of the concern for
maintaining the integrity of the capital markets after the stock market crash
of 1929,138 generally prohibit the use of fraudulent or deceptive practices in
the context of buying or selling securities.139
What constitutes a fraudulent or deceptive practice does not appear in the
statute or Rule 10b-5. Instead, courts look to common law principles of
fraud and deceit to define actionable behavior.140 Under those traditional
common law principles, silence typically does not provide a cause of action
for deceit.141 But in the insider trading context, the Supreme Court has
articulated a special disclosure obligation based on the existence of a
fiduciary relationship, either between corporate insiders and company
shareholders or between traders and the source of material nonpublic
information.142 For instance, the Supreme Court requires that to avoid
liability for improper insider trading, a corporate insider who possesses
material nonpublic information must disclose that information or abstain
from trading altogether.143 The special obligation contained in the
“disclose or abstain” rule stems from the fundamental notion that corporate
insiders cannot use property belonging to the corporation (i.e., information)
to deceive or gain an advantage over those to whom a fiduciary duty of trust
is owed.144 It is precisely because silence would constitute a breach of a
fiduciary duty of loyalty that the Supreme Court imposes upon insiders a
special disclosure duty prior to trading.
The Supreme Court currently recognizes two primary theories of insider
trading liability—the classical insider theory and the misappropriation
theory. Under each theory, actionable insider trading occurs when an
individual trades (or tips others to trade)145 based on material nonpublic

138. See Susan B. Heyman, Rethinking Regulation Fair Disclosure and Corporate Free
Speech, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1099, 1111 (2015).
139. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on
Material Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 887–89 (2010).
140. See Nagy, supra note 2, at 1323.
141. See Steven McNamara, Insider Trading and Evolutionary Psychology: Strong
Reciprocity, Cheater Detection, and the Expanding Boundaries of the Law, 22 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 241, 262 (2015).
142. DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND
PREVENTION § 1:8 (2016).
143. Id.
144. Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 562 (2011) (“The
seller/buyer defrauds her counterparty in a trade by not disclosing that she has advantageous
inside information—and that her decision to trade is based on that information—when the
information is of a type that the counterparty would not expect her to exploit. The insider
trading prohibition is often described as a ‘disclose or abstain’ rule because there is no
deception, and thus no fraud, if the seller/buyer tells her counterparty about the particular
inside information she uses to trade.”); see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 219, 230
(1980) (holding that those “who have an obligation to place the shareholder’s welfare before
their own, will not benefit personally through fraudulent use of material, nonpublic
information”); Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 733–34.
145. The Supreme Court recognizes that insider trading liability can occur when an
individual tips another based on material nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary
duty. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Because instances of tipper or
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information in violation of a fiduciary duty.146 The essential jurisprudential
predicate of a fiduciary breach, however, must exist in order for an
individual to suffer liability for illicit insider trading under both the classical
and misappropriation theories. A better understanding of how disclosure
relates to those fiduciary duties provides a possible bridge for applying that
same “disclose or abstain” rule in the context of corporate political
spending.
B. Classical Insider Theory
First, the classical theory of insider trading targets a breach of an explicit
fiduciary relationship between a corporate insider and the shareholders.147
In the first case to explicate the theory, Chiarella v. United States,148 the
Supreme Court reversed an insider trading conviction of an employee of a
financial printing firm who traded in the stock of future acquisition targets
of the firm’s clients.149 In vacating the conviction, the Supreme Court
tethered the general “disclose or abstain” obligation to the existence of a
“fiduciary or other similar relation of trust or confidence” with the parties
on the other side of the transaction.150 Because Chiarella was not an
officer, director, or employee of the acquisition target companies, he
therefore had no fiduciary obligation to the target companies’ shareholders.
As a result, no duty to disclose arose regarding the material nonpublic
information he possessed about the impending takeovers and no fraud
occurred through his silence prior to trading.151
The classical theory thus embraces a fiduciary breach rationale for what
triggers a duty to disclose. Although previously, lower courts and the SEC
advanced an “access to equal information” principle as the guiding light for
prohibiting insiders from taking advantage of special access to material
information,152 the Supreme Court formally rejected that rationale.153 What
continues to remain the paramount consideration in establishing illicit
insider trading under the classical theory is whether a fiduciary breach
occurred.154 And for classical insiders, it is serving as a director, officer, or
tippee liability remain derivative of the classical or misappropriation theories, a full
discussion of details of tipper liability remain unnecessary.
146. See Kim, supra note 1, at 855.
147. Classical insiders are defined as directors, officers, or employees of the corporation.
See John P. Anderson, Greed, Envy, and the Criminalization of Insider Trading, 2014 UTAH
L. REV. 1, 18.
148. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
149. Id. at 227.
150. Id. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST.
1976)).
151. Id. at 230–31.
152. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (“[T]he
Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all
investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material
information.”).
153. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 (“[N]either the Congress nor the Commission ever has
adopted a parity-of-information rule.”).
154. See McNamara, supra note 141, at 260–65.
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employee of the corporation in which the securities are traded155 that
provides the fiduciary obligation to refrain from using the corporation’s
information for personal gain.156
C. Misappropriation Theory
The second basic theory of insider trading—the misappropriation
theory—similarly requires the existence of a fiduciary breach for illicit
insider trading to occur.157 In the misappropriation context, however, the
fiduciary breach does not arise in the context of a relationship with the
company in which the securities are traded.158 Instead, the fiduciary duty
arises out of a relationship of trust or confidence with the source of the
information.159 In United States v. O’Hagan,160 the Supreme Court upheld
an insider trading conviction of a law firm partner who used material
nonpublic information about a client’s intended acquisition of another
company to trade in the target company’s stock. Although O’Hagan had no
duty to the target company, as a partner in the firm he had a fiduciary duty
to the firm and its clients.161 By failing to disclose to his firm and client
that he intended to trade, he breached an essential fiduciary duty of trust and
confidence to the source of the information.162
In contrast to the classical theory’s focus on the fiduciary relationship
between the corporate insider and company shareholders, the
misappropriation theory examines the fiduciary requirements of the
relationship between the trader and the source of information.163 Therefore,
under the misappropriation theory, gaining immunity from insider trading
liability does not require disclosure of material secret information to the
public prior to trading.164 As the Court explained:

155. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 142, § 3:2.
156. The Supreme Court has also recognized this fiduciary obligation in the context of
temporary insiders. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983) (“Under certain
circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed legitimately to an
underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders
may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is
not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they
have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the
enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes.”).
157. For a full explication of the misappropriation theory, see LANGEVOORT, supra note
142, §§ 6:1–:15.
158. See J. Kelly Straader, (Re)conceptualizing Insider Trading: United States v.
Newman and the Intent to Defraud, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1419, 1431 (2015).
159. Id. at 1431–32.
160. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
161. Id. at 653 (“In this case, the indictment alleged that O’Hagan, in breach of a duty of
trust and confidence he owed to his law firm, Dorsey & Whitney, and to its client, Grand
Met, traded on the basis of nonpublic information regarding Grand Met’s planned tender
offer for Pillsbury common stock.”).
162. Id. at 654.
163. Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928, 938–
39 (2014).
164. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654.
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Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves
feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to
the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no
“deceptive device” and thus no § 10(b) violation—although the fiduciaryturned-trader may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty of
loyalty.165

Thus, the nature of the fiduciary duty at stake defines the ambit of the
disclosure necessary to avoid liability.
The misappropriation theory extends rather than supplants the classical
insider theory for illicit trading. A classical insider who trades based on
material nonpublic information clearly violates a fiduciary duty of trust to
the shareholders of the corporation in which the securities are traded. But
that insider also misappropriates the information based on a breach of the
same fiduciary duty owed to shareholders.166 The misappropriation theory
captures individuals who have no relationship with the company in which
securities are traded but who nonetheless breach a similar fiduciary duty of
trust by using the information for personal gain.
Regardless of the theory of insider trading considered, the breach of
fiduciary duty of trust remains an essential predicate for liability. The
disclose or abstain rule applies in each context to prevent the breach,
although the scope of the audience for the disclosure to immunize a trader
from liability changes depending upon the fiduciary relationship
considered. Nonetheless, disclosure remains the essential cleansing agent
for otherwise deceitful trading activity.
D. The Malleable Materiality Threshold
Insider trading liability can only arise when individuals trade on the basis
of material nonpublic information. According to the Supreme Court,
information is material to the extent there is a “substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.”167 For contingent events, a materiality determination also takes
into account the probability that an event will occur against the magnitude
of its potential effect.168
Despite any appearance of mathematical precision, the materiality
threshold remains somewhat malleable if not entirely vague.169 Many

165. Id. at 655.
166. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 219, 228–30 (1980).
167. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)); see also LANGEVOORT, supra note 142, § 5:2.
168. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that
materiality involves “a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur
and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity”).
169. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart and the Forbidden Fruit: A New
Story of Eve, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1017, 1032–33; see also Stephen J. Crimmins, Insider
Trading: Where Is the Line?, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 330, 341–42.
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academics170 and market professionals have criticized the lack of clarity in
the materiality standard for insider trading, whether for inhibiting
disclosure,171 providing perverse incentives to corporate managers to seek
short-term gains,172 increasing corporate costs,173 or ignoring prevailing
investor preferences.174 Some suggest that the purposeful vagueness of the
materiality standard enables insiders to escape liability for illicit insider
trading.175 Others suggest the ambiguity injects some prosecutorial bias
and arbitrariness into enforcement.176 Irrespective of the deleterious
repercussions of a loose definition, the controlling conception of materiality
necessary to trigger insider trading liability remains quite capacious.
Understanding the potential breadth of materiality in the insider trading
context helps inform when a disclosure obligation might be triggered in the
corporate political spending context.
To the extent it seems
jurisprudentially reasonable to incorporate the disclose or abstain rule from
insider trading into the fiduciary duty of loyalty implicated in corporate
political spending, the reach of that disclosure obligation becomes more
apparent. If a reasonable investor might find political spending by the
corporation relevant to a determination of whether to purchase or sell
company stock, then disclosure of even small levels of political spending
might require public airing.
III. PROHIBITING POLITICAL INSIDER TRADING
In light of the increasing dominance of corporations in the political
realm, the ability of corporations to secretly influence elections with dark
money spending, and an almost deafening clamor for greater transparency
regarding corporate political activity, the application of the disclose or
abstain rule from insider trading to corporate political spending seems
intellectually justifiable and practically necessary. Making the case for that
doctrinal transfer, however, requires a greater explication of the fiduciary
duties implicated in corporate political spending, the materiality of political

170. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Introduction: Mapping the Future of Insider Trading
Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps, and Strategies, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 281, 285; Joan
MacLeod Heminway, Just Do It!: Specific Rulemaking on Materiality Guidance in Insider
Trading, 72 LA. L. REV. 999, 1007–10 (2012).
171. LAURA S. UNGER, SEC, SPECIAL STUDY: REGULATION FAIR DISCLOSURE REVISITED
(2001), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm [https://perma.cc/HGM2-24C7].
172. Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between
Current and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044, 1052 n.29 (2005).
173. James J. Park, Assessing the Materiality of Financial Misstatements, 34 J. CORP. L.
513, 531 (2009).
174. Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Corporate Disclosure, a Murky Definition of Material,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 5, 2011, 5:57 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/
in-corporate-disclosure-a-murky-definition-of-material/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/W5CD-UL
US].
175. Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, Defining “Material, Nonpublic”: What
Should Constitute Illegal Insider Information?, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 327, 375
(2016) (“[O]ur evidence indicates that insiders are taking advantage of this vagueness in the
law to exploit their material, nonpublic information.”).
176. See Heminway, supra note 170, at 1010–11.
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spending to investor preferences, and the feasibility of a mandatory
disclosure rule for corporate spending under existing corporate governance
standards and the First Amendment.
A. Suspicious Agendas, Secret Spending,
and the Business Judgment Rule
Perhaps the main jurisprudential hurdle for justifying the adoption of a
disclose or abstain rule for corporate political spending is establishing the
similarity of the fiduciary obligations that apply in the context of insider
trading with the fiduciary duties involved in corporate political spending.
The essential question is whether the concerns in each doctrinal realm are
sufficiently similar so that transferring common law duties from one
context to the other does not seem odd. Indeed, there are many instances in
the common law when gaps in one doctrinal area look to another for
guidance.177 In both the insider trading realm and in the context of
corporate political spending, a potential breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty
by directors and officers secretly using the company’s assets for personal
gain provides a common thread.178 And in each case, disclosure of the
potentially illicit activity remains a necessary step to ensure no breach of a
fiduciary duty exists.
But why doesn’t the business judgment rule simply control whether
corporate managers comport with their fiduciary duties in making political
contributions?179 When corporate managers face challenges to the wisdom
of using the corporate treasury to engage in political activity, the broad
umbrella of protection that the business judgment rule affords represents a
great place to seek refuge.180 A common law doctrine recognized in every
jurisdiction,181 the business judgment rule essentially insulates the business
177. See generally William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory
in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92; Paula J. Dalley, A Theory of Agency Law, 72
U. PITT. L. REV. 495, 497 (2011) (“Current thinking about agency law relies on the principles
of tort and contract law to provide a basis for the principal’s liability for her agent’s contracts
and torts, but those principles are unable to explain the law fully.”); Jennifer E. Laurin,
Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 670 (2011); Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 459 (2010); see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445
(2003) (applying agency principles to determine the meaning of “employee” under the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990).
178. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653–54 (1983); see also United States v. O’Hagan,
521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997).
179. See Joseph K. Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, 86 U. COLO.
L. REV. 477, 484 (2015).
180. See id.; see also Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights
Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 257–58 (1981); David Rosenberg, Goodwill
and the Excesses of Corporate Political Spending, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 29, 31–32 (2015).
For an early example of the strategy, see Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (holding that the business judgment rule insulated directors from liability even if
political contributions to political parties in foreign countries were illegal).
181. For a detailed description of the evolution and application of the modern business
judgment rule since its inception in the early 1800s, see D. Gordon Smith, The Modern
Business Judgment Rule, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 83
(Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016); see also Franklin A. Gevurtz, The
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decisions of directors and officers from reproach by courts, and from
liability to shareholders, as long as those decisions were made in the
absence of fraud, illegality, conflict of interest, or gross negligence.182 No
doubt, corporate managers would assert that engaging in political activity—
whether through direct lobbying, participation in trade associations, issue
advertising, or political contributions to committees, parties and
candidates—simply represents one mundane aspect of business as usual.183
Helping shape legislation and viewpoints in ways that increase profitability
should not be considered any different than crafting an effective marketing
campaign.184 As a result, the business judgment rule should insulate
decisions about corporate political spending from attack, just as decisions in
the ordinary course of business remain immune from reproach. From the
viewpoint of corporate managers, judges with no business acumen and
nettlesome shareholders with fetish political interests should simply step
aside and let business experts determine how best to pursue the interests of
the company.
Despite the obvious appeal to directors and officers of invoking the
business judgment rule, application of the doctrine seems inapposite in the
case of secret political spending. As already discussed, a strong business
case for political contributions does not exist.185 Therefore, even if
corporate political spending were public, the wisdom of such expenditures
would be difficult to establish. Of course, corporate managers need not
prove that any business decision maximizes shareholder wealth or enhances
profits in the short term to garner the protection of the business judgment
rule.186 Quite to the contrary, the very purpose of the business judgment
rule is to afford adequate leeway to managers to take risks and direct
corporate affairs without undue distraction.187 But a crucial caveat for
protection is the absence of conflicts of interest infecting the managers’
decisions.188 When conflicts of interest arise, no presumption exists that
managerial decisions comport with their fiduciary duties to the corporation
and its shareholders.
Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
287, 297–98 (1994); Lori McMillan, The Business Judgment Rule as an Immunity Doctrine,
4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 521, 526–31 (2013).
182. See Michael R. Siebecker, The Duty of Care and Data Control Systems in the Wake
of Sarbanes-Oxley, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 821, 825–26 (2010); see also Kenneth B. Davis,
Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking—Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW.
U. L. REV. 1, 59–60 (1985); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands for Conscious
Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1667–
69 (2001).
183. See Leahy, supra note 179, at 483 n.7.
184. See Sarah C. Haan, The CEO and the Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Deregulation, 109 NW. U. L REV. 269, 275–76 (2014).
185. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
186. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 601–02 (2003).
187. Id. at 583–84.
188. See Elizabeth F. Brown, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Is There a Need for a
Safe Harbor for Aspirational Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 367,
390–91 (2008).
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Clandestine political spending, however, unavoidably raises the specter
of a duty of loyalty breach. Academics,189 journalists,190 politicians,191 and
market professionals192 have sounded the alarm that secrecy makes it
impossible to discern if corporate managers use company coffers to pursue
personal interests (whether financial or moral) at the expense of shareholder
wealth. With increasing pressure on companies from the private and public
sectors for greater transparency,193 and in light of the increasing number of
companies voluntarily disclosing political spending policies and
practices,194 the very decision to keep corporate spending closeted creates a
reasonable suspicion that there is something illicit to hide.
The potential retort that secrecy avoids potential investor and consumer
backlash for unpopular political commitments rings hollow. Although
discontent from those groups certainly imposes significant costs, academic
and professional literature195—along with current market practices196—
make clear that only through transparency about political activity can
executives effectively manage the expected benefits against potential
costs.197 If secrecy does not make business sense and the market continues
to embrace greater transparency, then the impetus for keeping corporate
political spending secret becomes necessarily and especially suspect.198 As
a result of the inescapable questions regarding managerial motives in
actively concealing corporate political activity, the conflict of interest
exception to the business judgment rule should prevent officers and
directors from escaping substantive review.199
The kind of fiduciary infidelity that triggers the exception to the business
judgment rule mirrors the potential duty of loyalty breach animating the
disclose or abstain rule in the insider trading context. Although some
academic debate exists about the philosophical beginnings of a duty of
loyalty breach in the insider trading context,200 the Supreme Court
embraces the basic agency law principle that agents cannot use the
principal’s property to earn secret profits.201 Whether in the classical
insider or misappropriation context, the fiduciary infidelity lies in using
proprietary information without prior disclosure.202 It might seem odd to
think of the basic concern as focused on the secrecy of the profits rather
189. See, e.g., Haan, supra note 184, at 275–76.
190. See, e.g., Devaney, supra note 53.
191. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 56.
192. See, e.g., Ardinger, supra note 47.
193. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Nathan, supra note 95.
195. See generally Coates, supra note 5.
196. See generally CONFERENCE BD., supra note 99.
197. Id.
198. See Leahy, supra note 179, at 484.
199. See Rosenberg, supra note 180, at 42–44.
200. See generally LANGEVOORT, supra note 142.
201. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983); see also Donna M. Nagy, The “Possession
vs. Use” Debate in the Context of Securities Trading by Traditional Insiders: Why Silence
Can Never Be Golden, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1129, 1169 (1999).
202. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.
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than on the profits themselves.203 Under basic agency principles, the agent
would also need to disgorge any unauthorized profits to the principal as an
additional fiduciary obligation.204 The secret use of property and profits
derived from unauthorized use, however, mark two separate fiduciary
breaches in the principal-agent relationship. The loyalty breach targeted in
the insider trading context remains the use of property (i.e., information)
obtained through a relationship of trust without disclosure to the fiduciary
partner.205 That is the precise fiduciary concern at stake in the context of
corporate political spending, except that the property used is money rather
than information. The disclose or abstain rule incentivizes fidelity—at least
to that basic obligation of transparency. If a corporate manager used the
corporate treasury to gain personal profits, agency law principles also
require disgorgement to the principal.206 But it is the potential for the initial
fiduciary misstep that should cause the disclose or abstain rule to adhere in
instances of corporate political spending, just as it does in the insider
trading realm.
But why should secret political spending be treated any differently than
managerial decisions to donate corporate funds to charities or to engage in
socially responsible business practices?207 With respect to charitable
donations and corporate social responsibility (CSR), no statutory or
common law rule requires disclosing a corporation’s specific commitments.
Instead, corporate executives remain free to direct corporate funds toward
charitable ends or to embrace socially responsible behavior to promote the
long-term interests of the corporation. Arguably, those activities represent
ordinary tactics in an overall corporate strategy to bolster a firm’s
reputation and image.
Secret political spending, however, does not resemble charitable giving
or socially responsible behavior. Despite the rhetoric of unity that many
politicians embrace, the political process necessarily polarizes with
identifiable winners and losers. For many people, politics is the
quintessential dirty zero-sum game208 with politicians and political causes
competing for scarce resources and votes.209 In contrast, charitable activity

203. See Danielle DeMasi Chattin, The More You Gain, the More You Lose: Sentencing
Insider Trading Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 177
(2010).
204. See Thomas A. Lambert, Overvalued Equity and the Case for an Asymmetric Insider
Trading Regime, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1045, 1127 n.366 (2006).
205. See Nagy, supra note 201, at 1158–63.
206. See Lambert, supra note 204, at 1127.
207. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the
Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1118 (2002).
208. See Leahy, supra note 179, at 533–36.
209. See Adam Nagourney, Going Dirty, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/going-dirty.html [https://perma.cc/JWY5-25
MV]. See generally KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS: DECEPTION, DISTRACTION,
AND DEMOCRACY (1992).
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represents a public good,210 and as a society we provide incentives (in the
form of tax deductions) for supporting charitable enterprises.211
Embracing CSR does not reflect charitable behavior, especially if a
market for CSR exists where consumers and investors are willing pay a
premium in stock or product price to companies that embrace social
responsibility. But even conceived in those market terms, the advent and
endurance of socially responsible business behavior results because all
parties realize a win-win trade.212 No such societal Pareto improvement
exists in the world of clandestine corporate political spending where
concerns of managerial duplicity and secret agendas threaten to undermine
shareholder wealth.
Thus, affording unquestioning blanket protection under the business
judgment rule to clandestine corporate political spending decisions would
ignore the wholly reasonable suspicion that executives are using corporate
assets without the knowledge of shareholders for personal gain. The
disclose or abstain rule in the insider trading context targets the very same
potential fiduciary breach. Applying that rule for transparency seems to be
an essential first step before blithely accepting a presumption that directors
and officers act in concert with their fiduciary duties.
B. The Materiality of Morality
Although the fiduciary obligations at stake seem quite similar in the
insider trading and corporate political contexts, imposing a disclose or
abstain rule to corporate political spending would seem warranted only if
the spending were material to investors. Some scholars suggest that
corporate political spending does not have a material effect on corporate
profitability and thus should not be subject to disclosure.213 Others
similarly suggest that if a company engages in corporate political activity
that has a material effect on business, existing securities rules and
regulations already require disclosure in standard corporate filings.214 For
those antidisclosure proponents, forcing additional disclosure obligations on
the corporation would only impose significant costs without any noticeable
gains to shareholders.215 What the antidisclosure approach misses, and
what the shift to a consideration of corporate political spending under
insider trading principles illuminates, is that materiality remains tethered to
the purchasing preferences of shareholders.

210. See Bruce Chapman, Between Markets and Politics: A Social Choice Theoretic
Appreciation of the Charitable Sector, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 821, 832–33 (1998).
211. Of course, no tax breaks exist for political spending.
212. See Siebecker, supra note 45, at 162–69; see also Siebecker, supra note 82, at 148–
51.
213. See James R. Copland, Against an SEC-Mandated Rule on Political Spending
Disclosure: A Reply to Bebchuk and Jackson, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 381, 384 (2013).
214. Daniel M. Gallagher, Disclosure Is Just a Means to a Political End, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 4, 2016, 3:06 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/disclosure-is-just-a-means-to-apolitical-end-1460660761?mg=id-wsj [https://perma.cc/H3N5-X5T5].
215. Copland, supra note 213, at 391–92.
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Without doubt, a corporation’s social and political viewpoints matter to
investors. As detailed above, in the United States alone, more than $6.5
trillion is invested based on SRI strategies.216 The basic viability of the
almost $45 trillion worldwide market for CSR rests on the ability of
investors and consumers to ascertain and reward companies that embrace
socially responsible practices.217 Large institutional investors, financial
advisory firms, advocacy groups, nonprofit organizations, public policy
centers, politicians, and even (reluctantly and only recently) the SEC
acknowledge that investors seriously consider the environmental, social,
and political commitments of a company prior to purchasing stock.218
The additional concerns of consumers and other stakeholders make the
materiality calculation even more certain. To the extent consumers boycott
company products or lose faith in a corporate brand due to unwanted
corporate political activity, the profitability of the company is necessarily
affected. That connection between consumer behavior and the corporate
bottom line would rationally cause shareholders who have no CSR bent to
find corporate positions on social and political issues material to a decision
to buy or sell company stock.219
But how much political spending must occur to cross the materiality
threshold? Quite simply, any political spending would seem to suffice.
The intensity of investor preferences regarding socially responsible data,
including political spending, is not easily quantifiable and may swamp other
criteria in determining whether to invest. Consider how the Reform
Pension Board (RPB), an institutional investor with $1.2 billion in assets
focused on advancing Reform Jewish principles,220 would react to a
company in which it invested disclosing a $1,000 contribution to a
senatorial candidate who was a proud member of the Ku Klux Klan. Would
the RPB sell all of its shares? That is exactly the pledge of the Timothy
Plan, an investment fund dedicated to “biblically responsible investing.”221
According to fund managers, “we spent countless hours investigating
companies to determine if they were involved in any unbiblical practices.
In 1994, we pioneered the first pro-life, pro-family screening standard. Our
commitment, first to our Lord, is that we will not invest a single penny into
any company that violates our screens.”222 Faith-based funds remain a
significant portion of the SRI community and political commitments of
corporations remain core to their concerns.223 Of course, the existence of
216. USSIF FOUNDATION, supra note 75, at 12.
217. See generally Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1197 (1999).
218. See supra notes 74–87 and accompanying text.
219. See Siebecker, supra note 82, at 140–51.
220. See About the RPB, REFORM PENSION BOARD, http://rpb.org/about-the-rpb/ (last
visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/CZF2-PGWN].
221. See Timothy Plan: Investing with Biblical Principles, TIMOTHY PLAN, http://
timothyplan.com/download/Brochure.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
23CS-QMTQ].
222. See id.
223. See David Kathman, Getting Religion with Faith-Based Mutual Funds,
MORNINGSTAR ADVISOR (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.morningstar.com/advisor/t/65920341/
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intense faith-based investing preferences does not suggest that secular
socially responsible funds respond any less emphatically to instances where
corporations fail to live up to expectations.224 The point remains that
because many SRI investors possess intense preferences for socially
responsible behaviors that are not easily quantifiable, even small corporate
contributions to political causes remain not just material but often fully
determinative of investor decisions. And since a company cannot control
which investors constitute its pool of shareholders, the company’s political
commitments may have a great impact on the volatility of its shares.
Thus, despite the antidisclosure advocates’ focus on the cost to the
corporation of additional disclosure obligations, corporate political
spending seems to fall squarely within the standards for materiality
established by the Supreme Court.225
C. Fidelity in the Light of Disclosure
With the materiality of morality firmly established for the investing
community, the next step involves an examination of the potential
effectiveness of disclosure to prevent or expose a fiduciary breach in the
context of corporate political spending. In the realm of exercising corporate
fiduciary duties, trust and transparency remain inextricably linked.226 In the
case of insider trading, because the essential fiduciary breach results from
the failure to disclose prior to using for personal gain information obtained
in a relationship of confidence or trust, the disclose or abstain rule remains
perfectly targeted at preventing a breach at the outset. In the same way, the
secrecy of corporate political spending provides the focus of a fiduciary
breach because of the inherent risk that corporate managers are using
corporate treasuries to advance their particular beliefs to the detriment of
shareholders. In both situations, a disclose or abstain rule remains the
essential antiseptic for the fiduciary breach premised upon an agent’s secret
use of the principal’s property (whether money or information) for personal
gain.
The disclose or abstain rule does not target the personal gain for which
the agent uses the property. As Justice Ginsburg noted in the majority
opinion in O’Hagan regarding the breach of trust under the
misappropriation theory,

getting-religion-with-faith-based-mutual-funds.htm [https://perma.cc/JUU9-8ZWX]; Liz
Moyer, As Funds Invoke Bible Values, Others See Intolerance, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/business/dealbook/
christian-investment-funds.html [https://perma.cc/W48F-KJTD].
224. See Thomas M. Anderson, The 7 Top Funds for Ethical Investing, KIPLINGER (June
30, 2010), http://www.kiplinger.com/article/investing/T041-C000-S002-the-7-top-funds-forethical-investing.html [https://perma.cc/BJH2-3KP5].
225. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (noting that a “substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available”
(quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976))).
226. See generally Siebecker, supra note 45.
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Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves
feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to
the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no
‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation—although the fiduciaryturned-trader may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty of
loyalty.227

That secondary avenue for liability for using the principal’s property for
personal gain targets separate agency principles that require the
disgorgement of any profits. The same is true in the classical insider
trading context. The breach that triggers liability is the failure to disclose to
company shareholders (including all potential future shareholders in the
market) material nonpublic information obtained from a relationship of trust
and confidence with the corporation prior to trading.228 The fact that the
insider earned profits based on trading is a secondary concern that attaches
only to the amount of liability, whether under the umbrella of insider
trading sanctions or under basic agency law theory requiring disgorgement.
In a similar fashion to the manner in which the disclose or abstain rule
attempts to ensure individuals do not breach their essential duty of trust by
trading in securities without prior disclosure of their intent to their fiduciary
counterpart—whether to the source of the material nonpublic information
under the misappropriation theory or to the (potential) shareholders of the
company in which the securities are traded under the classical theory—a
disclose or abstain rule for political corporate spending would prevent
executives from being able to “feign fidelity” to the corporation and its
shareholders. A rule that requires disclosure prior to using corporate
information or assets provides a well-tailored mechanism to prevent
corporate managers from breaching their fiduciary duties or at least exposes
the breach to ensure appropriate liability.
Another important concern regarding the cleansing capabilities of
common law disclosure, however, is whether recognizing a mandatory
disclosure obligation in the case of corporate political spending would fit
appropriately within existing common law corporate duties or conflict with
federal securities laws. After all, there is no overarching federal corporate
law.229 The disclose or abstain rule articulated in the context of insider
trading ultimately rests on the statutory foundation of the federal securities
laws—a detailed regulatory regime focused on disclosure obligations that
could possibly preempt any new state common law disclosure rule.
If federal securities laws preempt or trump more stringent common law
disclosure obligations, the basic project of articulating a fiduciary duty of
disclosure for corporate political speech becomes futile.230 The federal
227. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997).
228. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
229. See Bernard Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 1:
Substantive Grounds for Liability (Report to the Russian Securities Agency), 2007 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 614, 645.
230. See 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 57–60 (1989)
(highlighting scholarly discussion of preemption spanning from the 1950s to the 1980s). See
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securities laws purposefully aim to provide uniform and consistent
standards of transparency for publicly traded companies.231 To that end,
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“the Uniform
Standards Act”) preempts many state law securities fraud provisions and
requires bringing claims for securities fraud in federal court.232
Nonetheless, even under the Uniform Standards Act, many state law claims
remain valid, including derivative actions based on violations of
shareholder voting and appraisal rights, as well as incomplete or deceitful
communications by the company.233 Pursuant to the widely accepted
“internal affairs doctrine,” issues of general corporate governance arising
under state law are not preempted by federal securities laws.234 As a result,
despite the basic intent of the federal securities laws to provide a uniform
disclosure regime, they do not foreclose the recognition of additional
disclosure duties based on state common law principles.235
Delaware, the state of incorporation for more than half of all domestic
public companies,236 provides the leading example of a substantial
fiduciary-based disclosure obligation that goes further than federal
securities mandates.237 For some time, Delaware common law duties of
loyalty and good faith have required full and accurate communication with
company stockholders on matters requiring shareholder action.238 A much
broader disclosure duty that applies to general communication with
shareholders, however, was announced by the Delaware Supreme Court in
Malone v. Brincat.239 That common law disclosure duty applies even when
the subject matter of the communication implicates areas that the federal
securities laws regulate.240
In Malone, shareholders complained that company directors breached
their Delaware common law duty of disclosure by filing false financial
reports with the SEC and regularly conveying to stockholders inaccurate

generally Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities
Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273 (1998).
231. See Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate
Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1190 n.139 (2006).
232. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
233. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1)(B)(ii)(II) (2012).
234. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (refusing to federalize all
corporate law regarding transactions in securities); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition,
117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 597 (2003) (describing the internal affairs doctrine that informally
limits the scope of federal authority from extending to state governance issues).
235. See Siebecker, supra note 45, at 142.
236. About the Agency, DEL. DEP’T ST., https://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last
visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/76RU-JMJ8].
237. Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Use of Efficient Market Hypothesis:
Beyond SOX, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1941, 1957–58 (2007).
238. See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992); see also Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure
Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1174 n.394 (1996).
239. 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
240. Id.; see also Siebecker, supra note 45, at 143.
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information about the company’s finances.241 Despite upholding the lower
court’s dismissal of the complaint, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that
“Delaware law also protects shareholders who receive false
communications from directors even in the absence of a request for
shareholder action. When the directors are not seeking shareholder action,
but are deliberately misinforming shareholders about the business of the
corporation, . . . there is a violation of fiduciary duty.”242 Citing the Senate
committee report on the Uniform Securities Act that explicitly recognized
the import of state law disclosure duties,243 the Delaware Supreme Court
couched its recognition of a fiduciary-based disclosure obligation as
“complementary” to the mandatory disclosure obligations under the federal
securities law regime.244 The very persistence of such a strong state
common law disclosure duty in Delaware reveals that substantial
jurisprudential room exists for embracing fiduciary disclosure duties
without offending federal mandates.
To be sure, a vigorous debate exists regarding the effectiveness of
flexible common law principles in efficiently regulating corporate
behavior.245 Some scholars suggest that the inherent ability of organic
common law standards to adapt to changing social circumstances more
quickly than legislative mandates246 necessarily leads to inconsistency and
indeterminacy.247 But in the case of a common law disclose or abstain rule
for corporate political spending, no such indeterminacy should exist in light
241. Brincat, 722 A.2d at 8.
242. Id. at 14; see also Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. v. Kennedy, 741 A.2d 377, 390 (Del. Ch.
1999) (“It necessarily follows from Malone that when directors communicate with
stockholders, they must recognize their duty of loyalty . . . with honesty and fairness,
regardless of the stockholders’ status as preferred or common, and regardless of the absence
of a request for action required pursuant to a statute, the corporation’s certificate of
incorporation or any bylaw provision.”).
243. See Malone, 722 A.2d at 13 n.42 (“The Committee is keenly aware of the
importance of state corporate law, specifically those states that have laws that establish a
fiduciary duty of disclosure.” (quoting S. Rep. No. 105-182, at 11–12 (1998))).
244. Id. at 13.
245. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism:
Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. LAW. 1 (2005); Mark Klock, Lighthouse or Hidden
Reef?: Navigating the Fiduciary Duty of Delaware Corporations’ Directors in the Wake of
Malone, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2000); Jennifer O’Hare, Director Communications and
the Uneasy Relationship Between the Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure and the Anti-Fraud
Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 475 (2002).
246. For a general discussion of the advantages of common law standards over statutory
initiatives in responding to changing practices, see Michael R. Siebecker, Cookies and the
Common Law: Are Internet Advertisers Trespassing on Our Computers?, 76 S. CAL. L. REV.
893 (2003).
247. For concerns regarding deference to common law standards in corporate law, see
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering
the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 601–02 (2002); Douglas M.
Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate
Law, 43 VAND. L. REV. 85 (1990); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in
the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205 (2001); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory
Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998);
David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 127
(1997).
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of the ostensible materiality to politically concerned shareholders of even
small amounts of political spending.248 As a result, the rule would naturally
enjoy a consistent and clear application across jurisdictions.
IV. POLITICAL INSIDER TRADING
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Do corporations have a constitutional right under the First Amendment to
engage in anonymous political spending? No matter how important
transparency remains to the ability of corporate managers to fulfill their
fiduciary obligations, the Constitution could trump and trample the rules
governing the most basic organizational relationships within the modern
corporation. Understanding whether a common law political spending
disclosure rule might pass constitutional muster requires a brief explication
of the various standards of scrutiny applied to corporate speech and the
current First Amendment battleground over politically tinged corporate
disclosures, as well as an assessment of the potential harm to corporate
interests through disclosure.
A. Wobbly Rungs of Corporate Speech Protection
Adopting an analytical framework resembling the tripartite standards of
review under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,249
the Supreme Court applies three distinct levels of judicial scrutiny to
corporate speech. If corporate speech relates simply to a commercial
transaction, the Court applies one of the two lower levels of scrutiny.250 In
contrast, regulations touching corporate political speech receive strict
scrutiny. What makes the three rungs of constitutional review so wobbly is
the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate what constitutes commercial
As
speech, political speech, or the boundaries between them.251
corporations increasingly engage in an artful alchemy of mixing just
enough political content with otherwise commercial messages in order to
evade regulation or liability, predicting which level of scrutiny the Supreme
Court might apply poses quite a difficult task.252
The lowest rung of constitutional review applies when the government
requires uncontroversial, purely factual commercial disclosures that
promote public access to complete and accurate information.253 In
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
248. See supra Part II.D.
249. For a general description of the levels of protection afforded under the Equal
Protection Clause, see Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal
Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059 (2011).
250. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976).
251. See Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an
Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 616–21
(2006).
252. See id.
253. See Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech Conundrum, 19
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 205, 218–19 (2011).
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Ohio,254 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
governmental requirement that attorney advertisements disclose their fees
for legal representation. After determining that the information subject to
disclosure was purely factual, the Court upheld the regulation as
“reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of
consumers.”255 Although the Constitution often abhors governmentcompelled speech,256 disclosure obligations targeting purely commercial
facts do not receive significant judicial scrutiny.
On the second rung of commercial speech review, the Supreme Court
employs an intermediate scrutiny test when government prohibits, rather
than compels, commercial speech. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Services Commission,257 the Court struck down a regulation
banning all advertising by a utility company after articulating a multipart
test to assess whether commercial speech deserves protection.258
According to the Court, governmental restriction of commercial speech that
otherwise relates to a lawful activity and is not misleading will be upheld
only if the regulation directly advances a substantial governmental interest
and is no more extensive than necessary.259 Although the Court asserted
that commercial speech deserved less protection under the First
Amendment than other forms of protected expression,260 the intermediate
level of scrutiny announced in Central Hudson has produced inconsistent
results.261 In some cases, substantial regulation of commercial speech is
permitted, while in other contexts, courts afford broad protection to
commercial speech even in the face of significant state interests.262
At the top of the jurisprudential ladder, the Supreme Court applies strict
scrutiny to instances of compelled corporate political speech. Although
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding corporate political speech remains a
bit murky, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of
California263 and Citizens United establish in tandem that the First
Amendment affords the greatest protection to political commercial speech.
In Pacific Gas, the Supreme Court struck down a California law that
required a utility company to include in its billing statements newsletters
from third parties opposed to the company’s viewpoints.264 Casting aside
the state’s assertion that companies could be compelled to disseminate
unwanted political content, the plurality opinion noted that “[t]he identity of
254. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
255. Id. at 651.
256. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1268–79
(2007).
257. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
258. Id. at 566–71.
259. Id. at 566.
260. Id. at 563; see also Siebecker, supra note 251, at 631–35 (discussing how Central
Hudson broadened the definition of commercial speech from what Virginia State Board had
previously established).
261. See Siebecker, supra note 251, at 631–35.
262. Id.
263. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
264. Id. at 5–7.
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the speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected.
Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the
‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas’ that the
First Amendment seeks to foster.”265 The Court found that the regulation
granting third parties the right to include in the utility company’s mailings
unwanted political messages was not a “narrowly tailored means of serving
Thus, despite the otherwise clear
a compelling state interest.”266
commercial purpose of the mailings, the required inclusion of an unwanted
policy statement created an amalgam of commercial and political content
deserving strict scrutiny.267
In contrast to the compelled political speech examined in Pacific Gas,
Citizens United addressed the First Amendment right of corporations to
engage in voluntary political speech.268 Citizens United involved a
challenge to section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), which banned corporate expenditures for speech that expressly
advocated the election or defeat of a candidate for office within thirty days
of a primary or sixty days of a general election.269 Citizens United sought a
declaratory judgment against the BCRA provisions because it intended to
distribute a documentary film criticizing then-presidential candidate Hillary
Clinton within the restricted time period of section 203. In determining that
BCRA section 203 violated the First Amendment, the Supreme Court
stated: “Laws that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny,’
which requires the Government to prove that the restriction ‘furthers a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’”270
Emphasizing that strict scrutiny would apply to any regulation that
encumbers political speech, whether by a person or a corporation,271 the
Court also overruled prior precedent in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce,272 in which the Court previously embraced a concern about the
deleterious effects of corporate influence over the electoral process.273
Taken together, Pacific Gas and Citizens United suggest that strict scrutiny
will apply to government regulations that prohibit or compel corporate
political speech.
Most certainly, this very brief explication does not intend to provide a
full or nuanced analysis of prevailing corporate speech jurisprudence.
Instead, the description of the somewhat vague First Amendment standards
265. Id. at 8 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
266. Id. at 19.
267. See Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 BUFF. L. REV.
847, 874–75 n.168 (2011) (positing that Pacific Gas requires applying strict scrutiny in cases
of compelled disclosure that involve an amalgam of “commercial and fully protected
expression”).
268. See generally Siebecker, supra note 15 (discussing the speech doctrine embedded in
Citizens United).
269. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 203, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012).
270. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to
Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
271. Id. at 342–45.
272. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310.
273. Id. at 660.
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surrounding corporate political speech simply describes the basic lay of the
land on the existing battleground regarding corporate political
disclosures.274
B. The Political Disclosure Battleground
A pitched battle over corporate political disclosures has already begun, as
corporations and business groups assert that the securities laws force
disclosure of corporate political speech without a compelling governmental
interest. After all, the securities laws require much more than disclosure of
raw financial data.275 In addition to purely factual commercial information,
the securities laws compel a corporation to disclose qualitative information
regarding the company’s code of ethics,276 business operations,277
competitive risks,278 legal proceedings,279 internal controls over financial
data,280 executive compensation policies,281 and management’s discussion
and analysis of the company’s financial conditions and operations.282 As
thoroughly detailed in academic literature, many of those mandatory
disclosures touch upon inherently political matters and thus provide a
powerful platform for asserting First Amendment claims.283 Describing a
few recent significant cases reveals that until the Supreme Court articulates
more clearly the definitions of commercial speech and political speech, and
the boundaries between them, corporations will continue to attack the
mandatory disclosures essential to maintain the integrity of the capital
markets under the flag of the First Amendment.
First, in Business Roundtable v. SEC,284 the Business Roundtable and
other business groups attacked the validity of new SEC Rule 14a-11 that
gave certain large shareholders the right to nominate directors on the
corporation’s proxy statement.285 Prior to promulgation of Rule 14a-11,
management unilaterally controlled who could stand for election for the
board of directors.286 Affording even some shareholders additional
274. For a fuller description of the cases involved in the current battle over corporate
political disclosure, see Michael R. Siebecker, Securities Regulation, Social Responsibility,
and a New Institutional First Amendment, 29 J.L. & POL. 535, 538–49 (2014).
275. 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2016).
276. Id. § 220.406.
277. Id. § 229.101.
278. Id. § 229.305.
279. Id. § 229.103.
280. Id. § 229.308.
281. Id. §§ 229.403–.405.
282. Id. § 229.303.
283. See generally TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (2012) (discussing a variety of corporate strategies to
evade regulation using the First Amendment); Siebecker, supra note 251.
284. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
285. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,782–87
(Sept. 16, 2010).
286. See Roger Lowenstein, A Seat at the Table, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 2, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/07/magazine/07wwln-lede-t.html (“Only the management
(or its handpicked board) chooses nominees, and it is an iron rule of American corporations
that ballots should not contain more nominees than seats. In the former U.S.S.R., this style
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electoral rights within the internal political workings of the corporation
marked a significant step toward promoting corporate democracy and
accountability.287
With respect to the standard of review, a jurisprudential brawl ensued.
Arguing that the rule compelled content-based speech in conflict with
management’s commercial and noncommercial interests,288 the Business
Roundtable urged the D.C. Circuit to apply strict scrutiny under Pacific
Gas. Under that standard, the Business Roundtable asserted that the new
director-nomination Rule violated the First Amendment289 because it was
not narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state interest and because it
directly conflicted with prior Supreme Court precedent invalidating
compelled political speech.290 In an amicus brief, a group of law professors
argued that the intermediate scrutiny test in Central Hudson should
apply.291 Contending that strong policy concerns related to maintaining the
integrity of the capital markets required much of the securities regulation
regime to inhabit an island of immunity from First Amendment review,292
the law professors argued that the new rule should pass constitutional
muster.293
Considering the increasing importance of a corporation’s moral, ethical,
and political commitments to shareholders, the election of directors who
ultimately shape those commitments certainly seemed to touch a political
chord.294 Avoiding any need to tread into the jurisprudential thicket of
corporate political speech rights, however, the D.C. Circuit invalidated Rule
14a-11 based on the SEC’s failure to conduct a sufficient cost-benefit
analysis prior to promulgating the rule.295 Although the SEC decided not to
appeal,296 Business Roundtable provides a clear indicator that business
interests remain focused on using the First Amendment to rend apart any
regulations that encumber corporate political speech rights.

of democracy endured for only 72 years. In American business it is timeless.”) [https://
perma.cc/LM33-TLCA].
287. See Siebecker, supra note 15, at 220–25.
288. See Opening Brief of Petitioners Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce of
the United States of America at 56–57, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (No. 10-1305), 2011 WL 2014800, at *56–57.
289. Id. at 58–59.
290. Id. at 57–58.
291. Law Professors’ Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144 (No. 10-1305), 2011 WL 496548 [hereinafter
Law Professors’ Brief].
292. Id. at 8 n.7 (“Considering the extraordinary importance of the securities regulations
regime to American society and the inextricability of the link between speech regulations
and the basic functioning of that institution, a strong institutional argument supports carving
out from the First Amendment’s reach the system of mandatory disclosure and reporting
embedded in the U.S. securities laws.” (quoting Siebecker, supra note 251, at 672)).
293. Id. at 8–9.
294. See Siebecker, supra note 15, at 163–69, 208–25.
295. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1155–56.
296. Press Release, SEC, Statement by SEC Chairman Mary L. Shapiro on Proxy Access
Litigation (Sept. 6, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-179.htm [https://
perma.cc/6XHS-KLE4].
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Second, in American Petroleum Institute v. SEC,297 the American
Petroleum Institute (API) and other business associations challenged on
First Amendment grounds new SEC Rule 13q that required reporting
companies to disclose payments made to governmental entities in
connection with the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or
minerals.298 API urged the D.C. District Court to apply strict scrutiny
under Pacific Gas299 because the rule was designed to promote the purely
political goal of “empower[ing] citizens of . . . resource-rich countries to
hold their governments accountable for the wealth generated by those
resources.”300 Using that standard, API argued that the court must strike
down Rule 13q because enlightening the world regarding the potential
corruption of foreign governments did not advance a compelling interest of
the United States and, in any event, less burdensome means to achieve that
political goal were available.301
Once again avoiding the need to reach the roiling corporate speech
claims, the Court struck down Rule 13q on the same failure to conduct an
appropriate cost-benefit analysis.302 The SEC decided not to appeal the
decision.303 Nonetheless, the case represents another clear example of
corporations attempting to use the First Amendment to evade unwanted
disclosures.
Finally, in National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC,304 the D.C. Circuit
announced that compelled disclosure under the securities laws of inherently
ideological corporate commitments violates the First Amendment.305 In
that case, the National Association of Manufactures (NAM), along with
other business groups, challenged on corporate free speech grounds new
SEC Rule 13p,306 which required companies to disclose if its products were
not “DRC conflict free” (defined as “products that do not contain minerals
that directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed groups” in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country).307 Although
the lower court determined that the regulation passed constitutional muster
under Central Hudson because Rule 13p directly promoted Congress’s
297. 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2013).
298. Id. at 8–11; see also Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed.
Reg. 56,365 (Sept. 12, 2012).
299. Am. Petroleum Inst., 953 F. Supp. 2d at 11.
300. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment at 31, Am. Petroleum Inst., 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (No. 12-CV-01668)
(quoting Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,366).
Although API did not argue expressly that the stated purpose behind Rule 13q was
“political,” the only reason stated—empowering citizens of foreign countries to hold their
governments accountable—is inherently political in nature. See id.
301. Id. at 33–37.
302. Am. Petroleum Inst., 953 F. Supp. 2d at 22.
303. Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Won’t Appeal Ruling vs Disclosing Payments Abroad,
REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2013, 6:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/03/us-secresource-extraction-idUSBRE9820Z820130903 [https://perma.cc/Q8S8-Y6H6].
304. 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
305. Id. at 373.
306. See id. at 365.
307. See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274 (Sept. 12, 2012).
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substantial governmental interest in promoting peace and security around
the Congo,308 the circuit court disagreed.309 With respect to the standard of
review, the court rejected the SEC’s claim that the conflict mineral rule
deserved the lowest level scrutiny under Zauderer, considering the
mandated disclosure was simply factual and related to the state’s interest in
preventing deception of consumers.310 Instead, the court stated that it was
“far from clear that the description at issue—whether a product is ‘conflict
free’—is factual and non-ideological”311 and that “[t]he label ‘conflict free’
is a metaphor that conveys moral responsibility for the Congo war.”312 The
court avoided a determination of whether such an ideological disclosure
regulation deserved strict scrutiny by determining that the regulation failed
even the intermediate scrutiny test articulated under Central Hudson.313
Specifically, the court determined that the SEC did not present sufficient
evidence that less restrictive means than the “conflict free” description
would fail to accomplish the SEC’s goals underlying the regulation.314 The
SEC recently chose not to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court.315 As
a result, it remains unclear exactly what level of scrutiny might apply to the
host of securities laws that compel disclosure of politically tinged corporate
information.
C. Anonymous Corporate Political Activity
So what would be the likely fate of a common law disclosure rule
targeting corporate political spending? Despite the ruling in National Ass’n
of Manufacturers, strong arguments support the notion that a disclosure rule
simply requiring corporations to report the identity and amount of political
expenditures should easily pass First Amendment scrutiny.
Even if Central Hudson remains the appropriate standard of review, a
common law corporate political spending disclosure rule would very likely
satisfy each prong of the test. To pass constitutional muster the under
Central Hudson, the “government must show (1) substantial government
interest that is; (2) directly and materially advanced by [the] restriction; and
(3) that [the] restriction is narrowly tailored.”316 Preventing executives
from using corporate coffers to advance personal ends in breach of
308. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46–47 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 748 F.3d 359.
309. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 748 F.3d at 373.
310. Id. at 370–72.
311. Id. at 371.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 372.
314. Id. (“[I]ssuers could use their own language to describe their products, or the
government could compile its own list of products that it believes are affiliated with the
Congo war, based on information the issuers submit to the Commission.”).
315. See Dynda A. Thomas, SEC Conflict Minerals Rule Legal Challenge Is Over—But
Not for Good, CONFLICT MINERALS L. (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.conflictmineralslaw.com/
2016/04/12/sec-conflict-minerals-rule-legal-challenge-is-over-but-not-for-good/
[https://perma.cc/9MGM-E9AJ].
316. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 748 F.3d at 372 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564–66 (1980)).
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fiduciary duties to shareholders promotes corporate and democratic
accountability, protects the integrity of the capital markets, and sustains the
viability of the $45 trillion market for CSR.317 Each of those interests
represents a substantial—if not compelling—governmental interest.318
Moreover, disclosure of a corporation’s political spending clearly advances
those interests by eliminating the ability of corporate managers to defraud
or dissemble. And to the extent a common law disclosure rule simply
requires disclosure of the identity and amount of corporate political
expenditures, not only would the rule be narrowly tailored but it would be
the only means that adequately advances the governmental interests at
stake. Considering the intensity of consumer and investor preferences
regarding a corporation’s political commitments, disclosure of the
recipients and amounts of corporate political spending provides the absolute
minimum to ensure fiduciary accountability, trust in the capital markets,
and the viability of the market for CSR.319
A potential counterargument might focus on the right to anonymous
political speech. Although the Supreme Court has certainly embraced a
right to anonymous political speech in certain contexts,320 the mere
disclosure of corporate political expenditures does not implicate the
essential concerns that animate a need for anonymity. In Doe v. Reed,321 a
case in which individual signers of a referendum sought a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the State of Washington from making referendum
petitions available in response to requests under the state public records act,
the Supreme Court held that the disclosure requirements survived strict
scrutiny under the First Amendment because they substantially advanced
the important governmental interest in preserving the integrity of the
electoral process.322 In discussing the contexts in which compelled
disclosure of political support can run constitutionally aground, the Court
stated, “[W]e have explained that those resisting disclosure can prevail
317. See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
318. See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 198 (2010) (noting that the state interest “extends
more generally to promoting transparency and accountability in the electoral process”);
Bulldog Inv’rs Gen. P’ship v. Galvin, No. 07-1261-BLS2, 2007 WL 4647112, at *8 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Dec. 26, 2007) (“That interest is to protect the integrity of capital markets, and
thereby to preserve the overall health of the economy, by ensuring that investors make
decisions based on full and accurate material information.”); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5 (1984); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186–87
(1963); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124–25 (1953); Merrick v. Halsey & Co.,
242 U.S. 568, 586–88 (1917); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 552–53 (1916); SEC
v. Wall St. Publ’g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Bangor & Aroostook R.R.
v. ICC, 574 F.2d 1096, 1107 (1st Cir. 1978); Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., Exchange Act
Release No. 5870, 38 S.E.C. 843, 844 (1959); Stewart v. Brady, 133 N.E. 310, 312 (Ill.
1921); Kneeland v. Emerton, 183 N.E. 155, 162–63 (Mass. 1932).
319. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 748 F.3d at 372 (“The government cannot satisfy that standard
if it presents no evidence that less restrictive means would fail.”).
320. Reed, 561 U.S. at 200. See generally Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in
Favor of Disclosure?: Revealing Money in Politics After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed,
27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057 (2011).
321. 561 U.S. 186 (2010).
322. Id. at 190.
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under the First Amendment if they can show ‘a reasonable probability that
the compelled disclosure [of personal information] will subject them to
threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private
parties.’”323 Citing Citizens United, the Court noted that that disclosure of
political activity by an organization would be similarly impermissible if the
members of the organization would face similar harm.324
Requiring a corporation to disclose the mere fact of its political spending
will not expose the shareholders (i.e., the ultimate owners of the
corporation) to threats, harassment, or reprisals by government. The only
actors who might face sanctions as a result of disclosure are executives who
have breached a fiduciary duty in directing for personal gain the secret
political ends to which the corporate treasury might be used. That very
ability to hold corporate managers accountable represents an important
animating concern in affording corporations such broad political speech
rights in Citizens United.325 Again, as Justice Kennedy asserted:
[P]rompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens
with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials
accountable for their positions and supporters. Shareholders can
determine whether their corporation’s political speech advances the
corporation’s interest in making profits, and citizens can see whether
elected officials are “‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests.”326

Such an appreciation for corporate transparency and accountability would
seem bizarre at best if a constitutional right to secret corporate political
spending loomed in the background.
Thus, not only does adopting a common law disclosure rule for political
spending similar to the basic disclose or abstain rule in the insider trading
context seem necessary and feasible within existing corporate law
constructs, the rule would not adulterate the political speech rights
corporations enjoy under the First Amendment.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Incorporating a disclose or abstain rule for corporate political spending
into the basic common law fiduciary duties governing directors and officers
would afford significant benefits to the corporation, the capital markets, and
the political community.
A. Corporate and Democratic Accountability
Perhaps most obviously, requiring corporations to disclose their political
spending would engender greater accountability of corporate managers to
shareholder interests. As the Supreme Court and so many scholars, market
professionals, policymakers, and interest groups fervently contend, only
323. Id. at 200 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 4 (1976)).
324. Id. at 201.
325. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010).
326. Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 259 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
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with disclosure of corporate political activity can shareholders ensure that
executives are not using the corporate treasury for personal gain. Allowing
corporate political spending to remain secret can only serve the cause of
obfuscation and facilitate breaches of core fiduciary duties. Quite simply,
there can be no trust without transparency.
But the corporate accountability at stake goes even further than enabling
detection of culpability. The corporation itself has evolved from “a simple
investment vehicle to an increasingly dominant force” in shaping some of
the most important economic, social, and political aspects of our lives.327
Indeed, corporations encroach so deeply into territory once solely occupied
by government that boardroom deliberations supplant debates in the
traditional public sphere as the relevant battleground for determining the
path of our collective lives.328 Although shareholders traditionally occupy
passive roles in directing corporate affairs, a vital movement to enhance
shareholder democracy continues to flourish so that shareholder preferences
can be adequately taken into account before crafting corporate strategies
and policies. Only through mechanisms that enhance discourse between
corporate managers and shareholders (and arguably other relevant consumer
and stakeholder constituencies that affect shareholder interests) can officers
and directors ensure fidelity to the corporate interests that they are bound to
represent.
Secrecy necessarily undermines the accountability and
attentiveness corporate managers must afford their shareholder constituents.
And without the transparent discourse that enables such attentiveness, the
path the corporation takes risks running far afield of shareholders’ intended
destination.
Moreover, in light of the great power corporations wield in the political
realm, transparency regarding corporate political spending remains
necessary to ensure legitimacy in the polity. Citizens United explicitly
connected democratic accountability with the ability of citizens to
determine if elected officials might be corrupted by corporate influences.329
Because the corporation has become so institutionally important to our
collective political identity, “the integrity of [the corporation’s]
organizational structure significantly affects, if not controls, the confidence
in our democratic processes. If special interests, managerial imperialism, or
other antidemocratic values dominate corporations, we will realize a
diminished sense of citizenship within our polity.”330 Clandestine corporate
political spending encourages corruption rather than constructive civic
participation.331 As a result, a common law disclose or abstain rule for
corporate political spending could go a long way to protect the basic
legitimacy and integrity of our political processes.

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

See Siebecker, supra note 15, at 169.
See Siebecker, supra note 82, at 151.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370.
See Siebecker, supra note 82, at 152.
See id. at 152–53.
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B. Efficiency and the Market
for Corporate Social Responsibility
Without the ability of investors and consumers to trust in the accuracy of
corporate disclosures regarding environmental, social, and governance
matters, the market for CSR will collapse. Considering that more than $6.5
trillion in the United States currently gets invested based on socially
responsible screening criteria,332 such a market failure would cause
significant economic loss. Enabling corporations to hide their political
practices creates a regulatory regime fit only for charlatans and chumps.
An incentive would exist for corporations to attempt to curry investor or
consumer favor by publicly embracing a political position and privately
supporting a contrary commitment or candidate without fear of negative
repercussions.333 But even some of the cleverest fraudulent schemes
eventually come to light. And as consumers and investors become more
inured to corporate greenwashing and the projection of false corporate
images, the entire market for CSR will seem like nothing more than a circus
sham. As the Supreme Court famously noted, “[I]t is hard to imagine that
there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on market integrity. Who
would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?”334
In contrast, transparency regarding corporate political spending will
necessarily enhance corporate efficiency. Efficient corporate governance
rules reflect what corporate managers, shareholders, and other
nonshareholder constituencies would hypothetically negotiate in a world of
perfect information, freedom of contract, and zero transaction costs.335 Of
course, the reality of our world prevents those conditions from obtaining.
As a result, determining the content of the hypothetical bargain presents
quite a challenge.
Even if the precise outcome of the bargain remains a mystery, however,
transparency necessarily makes an efficient outcome more likely.336 Why?
On the one hand, if corporate managers are able to engage in political
activity without any reproach from investors, they will have no incentive to
take those viewpoints into account when determining what corporate path
to pursue. On the other hand, the vulnerability to shareholder action made
possible by disclosing corporate political spending provides the opposite
incentive to consider thoughtfully actual shareholder preferences. To the
extent corporate rules facilitate the consideration of actual shareholder
interests (whether on corporate political commitments or any other
concern), corporate managers more closely track the true preferences of
332. See USSIF FOUNDATION, supra note 75, at 12.
333. See Siebecker, supra note 45, at 134–36.
334. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246–47 (1988) (quoting Schlanger v. FourPhase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
335. See Hamermesh, supra note 238, at 1152–54; Williams, supra note 217, at 1201–03.
336. See Iris H-Y Chiu, Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically Examining the
Impact of Corporate Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 983, 989 (2014);
David A. Westbrook, Telling All: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Ideal of Transparency,
2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 441, 453; Williams, supra note 217, at 1199–200.
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shareholders rather than some stilted idea of shareholders’ interest only in
wealth maximization.337 Because some shareholders possess (intense)
preferences for a variety of environmental, social, or other political
commitments, ignoring the reality of their preferences in shaping corporate
governance rules disconnects the content of the rule from what real parties
to the bargain ultimately desire. A corporate political spending disclosure
rule would more effectively engage corporate managers in a dialogue with
shareholders about the extent to which corporations should even engage in
political activity as well what political beneficiaries best advance the
ultimate goals of the corporation.338 Through enhanced discourse that pays
adequate fidelity to the interests of affected corporate constituencies, an
efficient outcome regarding the content of corporate governance rules
becomes more likely.
CONCLUSION
A strong case seems to support using the same legal principles that
prohibit insider trading to require corporations to disclose their political
spending as well. The growing dominance of corporations in politics, the
lack of transparency regarding corporate political activity, and inevitable
suspicions about the motives of corporate executives in using corporate
coffers to advance their personal interests provides the impetus for such
jurisprudential action.
Using the fiduciary principles of trust that animate prohibitions on insider
trading does not seem particularly odd as a tool to inform the content of the
general fiduciary duties that corporate officers and directors owe to their
shareholders. After all, the basic abstain or disclose rule that the Supreme
Court recognizes in the context of insider trading arises from the common
law fiduciary duties that govern the daily decisions of corporate managers.
A fiduciary breach due to secret use of corporate assets for personal gain
marks the essential concern in both the insider trading realm and in the
context of corporate political spending. Thus, adopting a similar common
337. See Siebecker, supra note 45, at 163–64.
338. For a discussion on the need to assess the actual preferences and profiles of diverse
stakeholders in corporate law, see Helen Anderson, Creditors’ Rights of Recovery:
Economic Theory, Corporate Jurisprudence and the Role of Fairness, 30 MELB. U. L. REV.
1, 24 (2006).
[T]he long-term viability of the corporate enterprise relies on the cooperation of a
range of corporate stakeholders. In order to achieve this cooperation, ethics and
fairness must be considered as a means of fostering trust and reducing risk and its
associated costs. While directors are allowed to favour one cohort of corporate
stakeholders over another, this is only permissible where this is in the long-term
interests of the company.
Id.; see also Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and
Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 622, 635–37,
642–43 (2002) (addressing the need to take seriously all extant stakeholder interests in order
to promote efficiency from a behaviorally sensitive standpoint). See generally Cynthia A.
Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 705 (2002) (promoting a dedication to actual stakeholder and shareholder
interests in corporate decision making).
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law fiduciary rule that corporate managers must disclose the amount and
target of political expenditures or refrain from engaging in political activity
does not seem like much of an intellectual leap. Not only would such a
common law disclosure duty fit neatly within existing corporate governance
principles, but the compelled transparency would not offend corporations’
First Amendment rights. In the end, prohibiting political insider trading
through a disclose or abstain rule for corporate political spending would
promote greater efficiency in the capital markets, ensure corporate
accountability and political legitimacy, and sustain the growing market for
CSR.

